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The U.S.-Canada relationship encompasses strong partnership and economic 
interdependence; however, policy conflicts are prevalent throughout its history. Acute 
events―for example, the September 11, 2001, terror attacks―exacerbate the conflict, 
while raising the stakes of disunity between these two long-standing allies. Opposing 
policy priorities also undermine and interfere with their relationship. American 
policymakers have a security-first mindset while Canadians are primarily focused on 
efficient cross-border trade. Caught in the middle are the Great Lakes regional states that 
must straddle this policy divide.  
This thesis addresses the policy imbalance between the United States and Canada 
and considers how this dynamic affects both countries and the Great Lakes regional states 
through historical and contemporary lenses. In addition, a potentially disastrous but 
plausible future scenario addresses the detrimental consequences of maintaining the 
status quo in Washington and Ottawa. This analysis draws on numerous scholarly works 
and a variety of governmental reports, hearings, and strategies. The examination then 
turns to federal, state, and local border concerns, as well as institutional capabilities for 
comparison. Finally, policy recommendations focus each of the primary border players in 
the Great Lakes region on balancing their various economic and security interests along 
the shared border. 
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I. U.S.-CANADA BORDER SECURITY IN THE GREAT LAKES 
REGION: AN IMBALANCE THAT MATTERS 
At the border, cultures are mixed and traits exchanged, but goals and 
values are not always automatically blurred as many contend. 
—Canadian Political Economy Scholar Daniel Drache (2004)1 
Although the United States and Canada have not fought over their common 
border in 200 years, border security has reemerged as a critical policy issue in and 
between both countries after the events of September 11, 2001. One area of operation that 
presents unique challenges is the maritime border found on the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Seaway. On the one hand, with millions depending upon it, this inland 
waterway facilitates international trade between two long-standing allies and the rest of 
the world. On the other hand, this national frontier demands vigilant observation and 
protection. When these goals conflict, the underlying disconnection between U.S. and 
Canadian policy priorities are exposed—and, because it has not been addressed, could 
cause enduring rifts in the relationship between two of North America’s oldest 
democracies. In the meantime, the American Great Lakes regional states along the border 
must work with both sides, accommodating often divergent national agendas while still 
protecting the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. 
The United States has significantly increased its northern border security 
environment since the terrorist attack of 2001. The Canadians have responded similarly, 
though perhaps mostly at the U.S. behest. Their internal political concerns favor trade and 
are sensitive to kowtowing to American security policies, which reveals a very different 
view of border security from the U.S. model. Americans perceive Canadian border 
security contributions as burden-sharing through free-riding due to the magnitude of U.S. 
resources devoted to it. Canadians consider excessive border security as trade-inhibitive, 
and therefore, they use burden-shifting to counteract its effects.  
                                                 
1 Daniel Drache, Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America (Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 2004), 40. 
 2 
What are the national and regional ramifications of this imbalance for the United 
States and Canada, particularly if northern border security concerns attract less 
attention―and budget―in the future? And what implications and effects does the 
northern border security regime have for the several U.S. states along it? 
A. IMPORTANCE  
The United States and Canada have national policies that make border security a 
priority for both governments. In addition, the equitable allocation of limited federal 
resources is of the upmost concern for the multitude of U.S. governments impacted by the 
maritime border security issue.  
The United States and Canada both recognize the importance of maintaining the 
maritime security of the border. The 2010 United States National Security Strategy states: 
Security at home relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks 
by identifying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to 
operate within our borders, [and] protecting the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key resources... That is why we are pursuing initiatives 
to protect and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our 
borders, [and] ports … and to enhance overall … maritime … security. 
Building on this foundation, we recognize that the global systems that 
carry people, goods, and data around the globe also facilitate the 
movement of dangerous people, goods, and data. Within these systems of 
transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points of 
origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for 
exploitation and interdiction. Thus, we are working with partners abroad 
to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders. And we are 
developing lines of coordination at home across Federal, state, local, 




The Canadians have similar policies. According to the government of Canada’s website, 
“The Government of Canada is always looking at ways to increase security at the 
Canada-U.S. border. Canada has been and will continue to work in close cooperation 
with the United States to ensure that our shared border is closed to terrorists but open for 
                                                 
2 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010). 
 3 
legitimate trade and travel.”3 The combined commitment to border security was laid out 
in detail in the 2001 Smart Borders Declaration, which was signed by both governments 
and reiterated in the Border Action Plan of 2011. 
Combined efforts between the United States and Canada have a long history. Both 
countries have shared similar domestic and foreign policy perspectives like NATO—with 
their joint war and humanitarian efforts. As a world superpower, the United States often 
takes the lead role in these efforts, which has dramatically impacted Canadian politics in 
the past. Allen E. Gotlieb, the former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, once 
said, “In the drama of Canada’s foreign policy, the U.S. is always the principal actor; at 
the table where Canadians prepare the ingredients of their foreign policy, the U.S. is 
always the principal guest; when Canadians assemble to discuss their needs and destiny, 
the spectre of the U.S. is always there to dominate their thoughts.”4  
The American reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks altered U.S. security policies, 
and it has challenged long-standing strategic commitments, particularly border security, 
between the two allies. Americans focused on their security, which forced Canada to 
rethink and revise its border security polices, as well. However, trade has always been 
Canada’s primary concern. Ed Fast, the Canadian Minister of International Trade recently 
stated, “Our government’s top priority is the economy, and deepening Canada’s trade ties 
around the world.”5 Security still takes precedence in the U.S., but will Americans 
want—or be able to—maintain its current security posture? 
As budgets decrease and economic hardships on both sides of the border worsen, 
U.S.-Canada trade gains importance in American politics. Recently, at the Washington 
Council on International Trade, Ambassador Demetrios J. Marantis suggested that the 
American people expect President Barack Obama to “be responsive to [their] growing 
                                                 
3 Government of Canada. “Border Cooperation,” December 12, 2011, 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/can-am/bilat_can/border_frontiere.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
4 Allan E. Gotlieb, “The United States in Canadian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada, December 10, 1991, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/odskelton/gotlieb.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
5 Ed Fast, “Minister Fast Promotes Canada’s Solid Economic Performance to Global Business Leaders 
in London,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, August 8, 2012, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-communiques/2012/08/08a.aspx?view=d. 
 4 
concerns about trade.”6 On the one hand, this bodes well for the Canadians who suggest 
trade is negatively affected by increased border security. On the other hand, more of the 
burden for providing border security may fall to individual American states as federal 
budgets and popular support decline throughout the region.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Maritime border security on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system is 
intentionally unbalanced burden-sharing by the United States and Canada. It is further 
expected that the United States is assuming a majority of the responsibility for the 
maritime border security via funding, manpower, equipment, and institutional 
capabilities. The explanation for this imbalance can be found in the politics of both 
countries.  
Americans tend to practice a unilateralist approach to their security because of 
learned behavior from past security breaches. However, can Americans currently afford 
to assume the majority of the financial burden that comes with a unilateralist approach to 
border security, especially for the world’s longest border? Probably not, but convincing 
Americans to subjugate their border security to another country is unlikely at best. At 
worst, it could facilitate an unacceptable level of vulnerability to attack, which is still a 
fresh wound in the American consciousness.  
The Canadians take a different approach to security due to their concerns 
regarding trade, which has produced a highly polarized political environment over the 
border security issue. With the vast majority of Canadians living within 100 miles of the 
border, it is critical to their livelihoods to have safe borders that are permeable enough to 
facilitate efficient trade with the United States. Therefore, some political and business 
elites think that “the creation of a ‘security perimeter’ with the United States” is the best 
tactic, but others argue that it would be better to “deal with [the] United States on 
                                                 
6 Demetrios J. Marantis, “Remarks by Ambassador Demetrios J. Marantis at the Washington Council 
on International Trade on the Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific Trade Policy,” Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, July 19, 2012, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/speeches/transcripts/2012/july/marantis-WCIT-obama-asia-pacific-trade. 
 5 
‘specific areas of concern.’ ”7 At the heart of these arguments is the Canadian concern 
over legitimate trade between the two countries. This dichotomy between security and 
trade is the central problem with decisive Canadian border security action. Due to this 
stalemate, Canada uses burden-shifting to appease both political factions. 
Historically, Canadians prefer using burden-shifting security strategies. 
Throughout the Cold War, they used burden-shifting policies to allocate diplomatically 
minimal resources to security problems while working with their NATO allies. In the 
current border security arena, the Canadians are attempting to placate U.S. concerns by 
acknowledging the security issue, while encouraging Americans to take the lead and do 
most of the heavy lifting. Therefore, the recent U.S.-Canadian agreements that suggest bi-
national equitable contributions are in fact, divergent individual national policies that will 
result in an unbalanced border security approach. 
Why should unbalanced burden-sharing be considered a problem? Simply put, the 
United States is in the midst of difficult economic times. Budget cuts and limited 
resources are severely constraining the U.S. federal government. As public opinion shifts 
away from a security-first mindset, states such as Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and 
New York may be given increased responsibility for northern border security. These 
border security issues translate directly into the maritime border security environment. It 
is therefore proposed that these states be prepared to assume a greater role in U.S. 
maritime border security on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system, because 
they may be required to bear the brunt of the future financial burden. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the literature regarding maritime border security for the United States and 
Canada, four themes seem to reoccur. First, there is a political mismatch between the two 
countries, which can be identified in their national policies. These policies appear similar 
on the surface, but they contain subtle differences. Second, the perceived threat 
environment to both countries is different. Third, each country has distinct approaches to 
                                                 
7 Jonathan Paquin, “Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Reaching a Balance between Autonomy 
and North American Harmony in the Twenty-First Century,” Canadian Foreign Policy 15, no. 2 (July 
2009): 99. 
 6 
border security, and by extension, maritime border security. Fourth, the security 
institutions on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway vary greatly in quantity and 
reach. The combination of these four themes has resulted in an unbalanced burden-
sharing security environment on the northern maritime border, which someday may 
require American states bordering this waterway to assume greater financial burdens to 
secure it. 
1. U.S. Border Security Perspective and Policies 
Americans have found ample proof that border security is a valid concern. A 2010 
Government Accountability Office report (GAO-11-97) indicated that there are “many 
threats on … the northern border.”8 It also suggested “that the maritime border on the 
Great Lakes and rivers is vulnerable to use of small vessels as a conduit for potential 
exploitation by terrorists, alien smuggling, trafficking of illicit drugs and other 
contraband and criminal activity.”9 The GAO report’s assessments were supported by 
multiple senior officials during the 2012 United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security 
hearings, and an in-depth 2010 RAND report titled Measuring the Effectiveness of 
Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry. 
Border security concerns are backed up by a variety of security policies and 
budgets. To begin with, the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2012 Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan, the 2012 Northern Border Strategy, and the 
2009−2013 State of Michigan’s Homeland Security Strategy all place a premium on 
border security. Additionally, there has been a dramatic increase in funding and border 
patrol agents for the northern border over the last decade. A 2010 Border Security CRS 
report indicated that there was a “tripling of the Border Patrol’s northern border 
workforce in the years after 9/11.”10 Interestingly, “apprehensions along the northern 
                                                 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment 
of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, 2010. 
9 Ibid. 
10 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. 
Border Patrol, by Chad C. Haddal, CRS Report RL32562 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, August 11, 2010), 22. 
 7 
border declined gradually from FY1997 to FY2009.”11 Although border security is a hot 




For the time being, maritime border security is an American priority. The 2007 
U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship defines its 
maritime security role as the protection of “the U.S. maritime domain and Marine 
Transportation System, and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for 
attacks on U.S. territory, population, vessels, and critical infrastructure.”13 The U.S. 
Coast Guard’s strategic vision for the Great Lakes states, “We will safeguard the Great 
Lakes system and their maritime communities, advancing national objectives and shaping 
maritime border policy through a seamless binational enterprise of safety, security and 
stewardship.”14 There is a strong U.S. commitment to Great Lakes maritime security, but 
is it a cooperative effort with Canada? 
a. U.S. Unilateralist Security Approach 
Americans tend to take a unilateralist approach to their security. Joel 
Sokolsky and Philippe Lagassé wrote:  
Washington is aware that protecting the American people and prosecuting 
a global war on terrorism requires allies’ “wholehearted cooperation.” And 
even when cooperation is forthcoming, the United States will never 
wholly rely upon the efforts of other governments. This sentiment, so 
quintessentially American in form and content, is shared by both the 
                                                 
11 Haddal, Border Security, 23. 
12 White House, National Security Strategy, 2010.; Janet Napolitano, “Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2012-2016,” Department of Homeland Security, February 2012, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-strategic-plan-fy-2012-2016.pdf.; Janet Napolitano, “Northern 
Border Strategy,” Homeland Security Digital Library, June 2012,  
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=710991.; Rick Snyder, “State of Michigan: Homeland Security Strategy 
2009−2013,” State of Michigan: Executive Office, 2009, 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/Homeland_Security_Strat_FINAL_362552_7.pdf. 
13 Thad W. Allen, “The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship,” 
Homeland Security Digital Library, January 19, 2007, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470382. 
14 U.S. Coast Guard, Great Lakes Maritime Strategy: A Strategic Framework for the Coast Guard on 
the Great Lakes, (Cleveland: Ninth Coast Guard District, 2011–2016), 8. 
 8 
executive and legislative branches of the American government, and by 
both major American political parties.15 
Daniel Drache also recognizes the American proclivity toward unilateralism, and he 
pointed out that “Canadians and Americans do not inhabit the same security universe.”16  
The American unilateralist approach to border security is colliding with 
some specific Canadian concerns. Peter Andreas summed it up as the “Mexicanization of 
the US-Canada border.”17 President Obama appears to be willing to acknowledge the 
need for a more cooperative environment between the two allies. While recent security 
agreements appear to bolster cooperation, they actually placate Canadian border security 
concerns.  
b. U.S. Border Security Application 
One of the Canada-U.S. cooperative agreements was the Beyond the 
Border action plan, which President Obama signed in 2011. The plan focuses on a 
security perimeter approach, and it highlighted the need for Canadian cooperation. As 
usual, the Americans have been doing their part, and then some. In fact, “Congress has 
allocated considerable resources to increase staffing, purchase updated equipment and 
vehicles, build new stations, and deploy technology.”18 There also has been a number of 
operation and intelligence centers opened. A need for border security has even instigated 
stimulated new industries. For instance, Michigan is receiving millions to beef-up its 
border security.
19
 In addition, numerous new jobs are being created in Michigan’s 
security sector such as the Michigan Security Network (MiSN) company, which is in the 
                                                 
15 J. Sokolsky and P. Lagassé, “Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in Canada-US 
Relations,” Canadian Foreign Policy 12, no. 3 (2005/2006): 24. 
16 Drache, Borders Matter, 94. 
17 P. Andreas, “The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a 
Changing Security Context,” International Journal 60, no. 2 (2005): 449. 
18 U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security Hearing: 
Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America’s Northern Border and Ports of Entry, 2011 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Documents and Publications, 2011), 1. 
19 Associated Press, “Homeland Security Gives Michigan $4M to Improve Security at Canadian 
Border,” mlive.com, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/05/homeland_security_gives_michig.html. 
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process of establishing a Northern Border Security Test Bed (NBSTB) in the state.
20
 The 
question is: Will it last? 
In Michigan today, there are several federally funded programs contributing to the 
maritime border security function. These include: the Detroit Southeast Michigan 
Information and Intelligence Center; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
Operational Integration Center (OIC); more than 40 U.S. Coast Guard stations; and the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC). The Detroit fusion center 
manages state intelligence functions. The OIC coordinates and facilitates state and 
binational cooperative maritime security on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence 
Seaway system. The U.S. Coast Guard conducts maritime security operations via the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) program. Finally, the SLSDC operates and 
maintains the seaway system in cooperation with the Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway 
Management Corporation (SLSMC). Federal support is critical to maintain Michigan’s 
maritime border security programs. But, do these initiatives have long-term feasibility? 
c. U.S. Border Security Opposition 
Not all Americans support the current border security initiatives. Like 
many Canadians, their concerns focus on trade. One author, April Terreri, made the 
argument that some of the northern border security measures interfere with commerce.
21
 
Her points are directed toward land transport, but similar arguments would apply to 
shipping on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. Canadians Steven Globerman and 
Paul Storer agreed with Terreri. They argued that there were “significant adverse impacts 
on Canadian exports associated with post-9/11 border developments.”22 These barriers to 
trade with Canada will eventually steer American politics away from their focus on 
boarder security. If trade issues begin to dominate northern border security policies, then 
                                                 
20 Mark Sanchez, “Battle Creek Homeland Security Capital Fund Lands First Investor,” mlive.com, 
October 15, 2008, http://www.mlive.com/business/west-
michigan/index.ssf/2008/10/homeland_security_capital_fund.html.; Leslie A. Touma, “MiSN Working to 
Reinvent Michigan,” Technology Century 15, no. 4 (Winter 2010-2011): 29. 
21 A. Terreri, “Is Border Security Trumping Trade?” World Trade 20, no. 6 (2007): 42. 
22 S. Globerman and P. Storer, “Border Security and Canadian Exports to the United States: Evidence 
and Policy Implications,” Canadian Public Policy 35, no. 2 (2009): 183. 
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there would be a reduction in federal support resulting in states assuming a greater role in 
the border security realm. 
d. U.S. Northern Border Security Ramifications 
There is precedent for states assuming greater border security 
responsibilities. In the 1930s, immigration became a “matter of national security,” which 
caused a Canadian border office to be opened in Detroit, Michigan.
23
 As part of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Border Patrol numbers were inflated for 
the first time “for the task of securing our borders against enemy aliens.”24  Eventually, 
public opinion soured from WWII INS internment camps. In 1952, immigration practices 
reverted back to a more open policy on the northern border. The southwestern border was 
a different story because “sixty-two Canadian border units were transferred south for a 
large-scale repatriation effort.”25 This border security policy shift effectively forced the 
northern states to fend for themselves, and it stayed that way until 9/11 when the cycle 
started over. 
Although it is unlikely that the northern border will be abandoned by 
federal scrutiny anytime in the near future, there could be a change in federal priorities. 
Potentially, these priorities would move away from security and toward trade. Therefore, 
the states would be required to assume more of the burden of border security. Since 
Michigan has an expansive maritime border, that burden may fall squarely on its 
shoulders. In fact, this may already be happening. There is a “do more with less”26 
mentality that Washington is calling for to increase northern border efficiency. One 
recent binational initiative focuses on “reductions in compliance costs and border 
                                                 
23 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service—Populating a 
Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization,” (n.d.), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/ins_history.xml. 
24 U.S. CBP, “U.S. INS—Populating a Nation,” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/ins_history.xml. 
25 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Border Patrol History,” January 5, 2010, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml. 
26 Christopher Ford, Hanns Kuttner, Christopher Sands, Tevi Troy, and John Walters, “Northern 
Gauntlet: Michigan’s Homeland Security Advantage for America,” Hudson Institute, February 2012, 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/NorthernGauntlet--Feb162012.pdf. 
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crossing delays … [which] is more likely to win support within DHS and the U.S. 
Congress.”27 However, for the time being there is still plenty of funding to go around in 
the name of security. 
e. Recent Related Theses 
There have been two recent NPS theses related to maritime security. One, 
a 2010 thesis by Jeffrey Westling titled Securing the Northern Maritime Border Through 
Maritime Domain Awareness focused on interagency and bi-national collaboration of 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway 
system. He explained the maritime complexities of the system, and then he made 
suggestions for improving the MDA mission for the region. However, Westling’s thesis 
did not address how the U.S. government would maintain maritime security on the Great 
Lakes in lieu of future waning support by the American people or the Canadian proclivity 
to bolster trade at the expense of security.
28
 
A thesis by Laura Jean Thompson written in 2011, U.S. Maritime 
Security: Sustainability Challenges, critiqued the longevity and interoperability of USCG 
and CBP air and marine assets. She argued that U.S. assets are under tremendous strain to 
meet national policies laid out by the president. She recommended increased 
interoperability between the two organizations, and she suggested the institution of a new 
resource alignment approach that would assist them in meeting long-term obligations in 
the modern maritime security environment. However, Thompson’s thesis does not 
discuss potential retraction of the federal government in overall maritime border security 
or anticipated DHS funding cuts.
29
 
                                                 
27 Ford, Kuttner, Sands, Troy, and Walters, “Northern Gauntlet,” 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/NorthernGauntlet--Feb162012.pdf. 
28 Jeffrey C. Westling, “Securing the Northern Maritime Border Through Maritime Domain 
Awareness” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Sep/10Sep_Westling.pdf.  
29 Laura Jean Thompson, “U.S. Maritime Security: Sustainability Challenges” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/September/11Sep_Thompson.pdf.  
 12 
2. Canadian Border Security Perspective 
What is important to the Canadians regarding border security? In 2004, Canada 
implemented its first National Security Policy in recognition to the increased threat 
environment for North America. This policy contains “three core national security 
interests: 1. protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; 2. ensuring Canada is 
not a base for threats to our allies; and 3. contributing to international security.”30 
Evaluating these three interests highlights how Canadian security policy is closely 
aligned with U.S. security policies. However, upon closer inspection, the Canadian 
National Security Policy also suggests that “[e]ffective border management requires 
governments to treat the border as more than a single line at which threats can be 
intercepted.”31 Of course, Canada’s other border priority is trade. Therefore, while 
Canadians support increased security initiatives at the shared border, they do not want the 
policies to impede efficient trade. 
a. Canada Fears Too Much Security 
Canada took the border security mess in stride, but concerns remained that 
too much security was severely interfering with efficient trade with the United States. 
Peter Andreas summed up a number of Canada’s primary concerns in his 2005 journal 
article, The Mexicanization of the U.S.-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a 
Changing Security Context. Andreas wrote: 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Canada has experienced the kind 
of intense U.S. political scrutiny and alarmed media attention that has long 
been familiar to Mexico. The politicization of the border has unsettled the 
traditional special U.S.-Canada relationship and brought to an end what 
had been a mutually convenient low maintenance approach to border 
control matters … Canada and Mexico have become more painfully aware 
of the risks and vulnerabilities that have come with asymmetric 
interdependence: they are far more economically tied to and dependent on 
                                                 
30 Canada Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy 
(Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 2004), vii. 
31 Canada Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 41. 
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the United States than the other way around, and thus are much more 
vulnerable to security-related disruptions in cross border flow.32 
These fears have led Canada’s political elite to safeguard Canada’s trade with the United 
States the best way they know how―through long-practiced burden-shifting techniques. 
In so doing, new Canadian agencies, institutions, and policies have been put in place to 
quell American security concerns for the border. Most importantly, “Canada has played 
an active part on the war on terror.”33 These ambitious actions are paying off because 
trade efficiencies continue to improve as Canadians and Americans now look for new 
ways to ease border restrictions while maintaining border security interests. 
b. Canadian Policy: Continentalist vs. Internationalist 
Canadian national security is split into two political camps. Jonathan 
Paquin identified the camps as the Continentalists and the Internationalists, and then 
explained both perspectives. Paquin suggested that the Continentalists “argue that 
Canada’s relationship with the United States should define its policies. They maintain 
that Canada’s opposition to the United States hurts Canadian national interests by 
damaging Canadian-American relations and by isolating Canada.”34 The other camp 
stands diametrically opposed to this viewpoint. The Internationalists “maintain that the 
Canadian government must stand up for Canada’s autonomy by defending Canadian 
beliefs and values, especially when U.S. pressure is high… if it wants to reduce the effect 
of ‘every twitch and grunt’ of the American ‘elephant.’ ”35 These different perspectives 
highlight Canadian concerns of trade versus border security.  
Once the Canadians are separated into their respective camps, it is 
important to identify which camp is in power. Prime Minister Harper’s Canadian security 
policy falls into the Continentalist camp. Simon Dalby, a professor at the University of 
                                                 
32 Andreas, “The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border,” 449-50. 
33 Sokolsky and Lagassé, “Suspenders and a Belt,” 16. 
34 Jonathan Paquin, “Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Reaching a Balance Between Autonomy 




Victoria wrote, “The geopolitical vision underlying the Harper government seems to 
be … a Continentalist theme of security coordination with the United States.”36 
Interestingly, Prime Minister Harper signed the Beyond the Border action plan in 2011 
with the United States that focuses on perimeter security and economic competitiveness. 
In fact, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper and President Barack Obama announced that 
both countries would be taking steps to strengthen the security of North America’s 
perimeter so that the flow of people, goods and services across the shared border could be 
made more efficient than ever.”37  
These Continentalist views suggest a willingness to “focus on greater 
joint-security coordination between the United States and Canada” to create a “common 
security perimeter.”38 However, there is also evidence that “efficient” trade is critical in 
Canadian politics, and it is foremost on Prime Minister Harper’s agenda. Stéfanie von 
Hlatky argues that the border action plan is an attempt by the Harper administration to 




c. Canadian Security: Realists, Liberals, and Constructivists 
Keeping in mind current Canadian policies, in what way does Canada 
contribute to border security with the United States? The realists, liberals, and 
constructivists all have different perspectives. The realists suggest a need for burden-
sharing collective goods via free-riding, whereby “the stronger party is assumed to bear a 
larger share of the costs as the leader of the arrangement while the weaker party benefits 
                                                 
36 Simon Dalby, “Forward to the Past: Stephen Harper’s Geopolitical Imagination,” Carleton 
University, February 2012, http://http-
server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/DalbyHarpersGeopoliticsYork2012.pdf.  
37 The Office of the President of the United States, United States-Canada Beyond the Border: A 
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness (Washington, DC: White House, 
2011). 
38 Georges A. Tanguay and Marie-Christine Therrien, Protecting Canada and the U.S. Against 
Terrorism: A Common Security Perimeter?, vol. 10, North American Economic and Financial Integration, 
(United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2004), 85. 
39 Stéfanie von Hlatky, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Border Policy Coordination Between Canada and 
the US,” International Journal 67, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 437–43. 
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from the positive externalities generated by the actions of the stronger party.”40 However, 
collective goods theory assumes “the existence of a common interest among allies.”41 
Liberalists would argue that the Canadians could effectively pursue a cooperative 
approach via economic exchange, but they must also acknowledge that “the liberal view 
neglects the fact that economics and security are often competing interests.”42 Similarly, 
constructivists poorly account for the “diversity of interests within North American 
societies and [minimize] instances where Canadian and American interests are at odds.”43  
The realist view most closely fits the Canadian-U.S. border security 
reality, but burden-sharing does not. Burden-shifting is a better fit, and it is described as 
“the art of manipulating alliance relationships for political gain.”44 Prime Minister 
Harper’s public support of the Beyond the Border action plan was an example of burden-
shifting, because he implied that security trumps trade to President Obama, but Canadian 
border security practices suggest otherwise, particularly on the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Seaway system. 
d. Canadian Maritime Security 
There is not much literature on Canadian maritime security, but the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police website indicates a marginal shift in priorities toward increased 
border security on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. The Canadians have 
opened up one Marine Security Operation Centers (MSOC) on the Great Lakes in 
Niagara, Ontario. This MSOC was conceived to “provide a focal point for the generation 
and dissemination of an accurate, coherent, relevant and timely maritime domain 
awareness picture to support operations in the protection of national security.”45 
                                                 
40 Stéfanie von Hlatky and Jessica Trisko, “Sharing the Burden of the Border: Layered Security 
Cooperation and the Canada-US Frontier,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2012), 64. 
41 Wallace J. Thies, “Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO,” (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2003), 7. 
42 Stefanie von Hlatky and Jessica Trisko, “Sharing the Burden of the Border,” 67. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Thies, “Friendly Rivals,” 8. 
45 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Marine Security Operation Centre: Frequently Asked Questions,” 
October 17, 2008, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/mari-port/faq-eng.htm.  
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According to the Canadian Coast Guard website the MSOC uses “multi-agency 
integration.”46  
Interestingly, the current Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway MSOC is 
still a temporary facility with a staff of 44 employees.
47
 Additionally, there are plans for 
“4 permanent patrol vessels on the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway by 2013.”48 While 
these plans are commendable, they pale in comparison to U.S. maritime security efforts. 
This suggests that Canadians are giving the United States the proverbial ‘nod’ for their 
maritime border security efforts. Therefore, when Washington’s funding support for the 
Department of Homeland Security border initiatives evaporate, so too will Ottawa’s. 
Ultimately, the burden for maritime security on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Seaway will fall on the shoulders of the American states that border them, particularly 
Michigan. 
3. Filling in the Gaps 
There are a number of critical primary-source documents complete the research. 
First, the analysis draws on a variety of security policies. Second, political speeches, 
declarations, bilateral agreements, and reports provides specific context. Third, there are 
a number of journal articles, web documents, and Congressional hearings that fill in the 
gaps. Ultimately, this variety of source documents provides a vivid picture of how 
today’s U.S.-Canadian border security policies may lead to future financial obligations by 
American states to provide maritime security on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Seaway. 
                                                 
46 Canadian Coast Guard, “Marine Security Operations Centers,” December 6, 2011, http://www.ccg-
gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/Maritime-Security/MSOC. 
47 Melinda Cheevers, “Marine Security Ops Centre Breaks Ground: Multi-Agency Headquarters Will 
Make Move to a New Home on York Road,” NIAGARAthisWEEK.com, August 16, 2012, 
http://www.niagarathisweek.com/news/article/1486416--marine-security-ops-centre-breaks-ground. 
48 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Marine Security Enforcement Teams,” March 24, 2011, 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/mari-port/mset-esm-eng.htm. 
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D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion to 
determine the implications of a border security mismatch between the United States and 
Canada. Chapter II traces the history of cooperation and the retrenchment practices of 
border security between the allies. Chapters III and IV cover current border and maritime 
security policies and their implications for Canada and the United States, respectively; 
Chapter V investigates the U.S. Great Lakes regional states’ security concerns as they 
straddle the line between trade and security. The conclusion shows that security on the 
northern border is a challenging balancing act for the U.S. states in the Great Lakes 
region. They must cohesively interact with the federal governments on both sides of the 
shared border in order to reap the economic benefits offered by trade from Canada and 
funding from the U.S. Homeland Security enterprise. 
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II. U.S.-CANADIAN BORDER HISTORY 
 Canada and the United States share long-standing mutual security ties, but there 
have been times when the allies have not seen eye-to-eye on their shared border. The 19th 
and early 20th centuries proved politically volatile and in some cases, militarily hostile, 
while the latter parts of the 20th century until present day have seen only occasional 
discord between the two countries. The political relationship is currently what many 
would consider friendly, but Canadians have perfected a cordial wariness about American 
politics. They recognize the American proclivity for sweeping, sometimes sudden, 
changes and the potential effects of those changes on the U.S.-Canadian border. As such, 
Canada has mostly limited expectations for cooperation on the border, at least on the 
national (rather than state) level.  
The history of the U.S.-Canada border security environment has significant 
political implications today. Additionally, many of the agreements that frame this 
security environment have been renewed, updated, and in some cases superseded over the 
years. Importantly, these agreements and the relationship between the United States and 
Canada depict the extended commitments that both countries have shared in regards to 
border security even if other issues occasionally took priority. Thus, this Chapter explores 
the dynamic and sometimes tumultuous relationship between the two countries over the 
last 200 years. 
A. A PERIOD OF DISCORD 
In the 19th century, the U.S.-Canadian border marked a real frontier between 
uneasy neighbors with often conflicting political agendas. At first, Britain’s long 
shadow―and longer reach―accounted for at least one war and several violent incidents 
along or about the border. 
1. The War of 1812 
In many respects, the U.S.-Canadian relationship began to form in earnest in 
1812. By this time, the young United States was no longer willing to accept the British 
 20 
Royal Navy’s quasi-imperialist intervention in U.S. trade with other European countries, 
then in the throes of Napoleon’s wars and exactly the kind of military-dynastic 
adventures that the first generation of American statesmen, notably George Washington 
in his “Farewell Address,” found so distasteful. In retaliation for these trade restrictions 
and several provocative maritime confrontations (including the impressment of U.S. 
sailors into British service), a “hawkish” American government, led by President James 
Madison, declared war on Great Britain and by proxy, Canada. Some Americans assumed 
that “Canada would be easy pickings―that in fact an invasion would be welcomed by the 
Canadians,” because they believed that Canadians wanted to rid themselves of British 
control too.
49
 The Americans quickly realized the error of this assumption.  
During the War of 1812, Canada and the United States clashed several times. 
Some of these conflicts played out on the Great Lakes, which highlights the challenges of 
maintaining a border on lakes large enough to facilitate naval engagements. In the 
beginning of the war, Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, administrator of Upper Canada, 
captured Lake Huron’s Fort Michilimackinac in July and Detroit the following month, 
giving the British control of the Michigan territory. When the Americans first attempted 
to retake the territory they were badly beaten by a British-Canadian effort. By the end of 
1812, “[t]he only Americans in Canada were prisoners of war.”50 As the campaigns 
began in 1813, the Americans gained some ground by capturing York (Toronto) that was 
later abandoned for a bigger prize, Fort George, which was seized by the American fleet 
at the mouth of the Niagara River. Additionally, the American naval fleet, led by 
Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, defeated the British fleet at Put-In-Bay that fall. In 
doing so, the Americans gained control of the Great Lakes and recovered Detroit. At the 
same time, the ineptness of the U.S. military leadership on the ground led numerous 
American soldiers to their deaths. By December, American soldiers had abandoned their 
Canadian goals. Unfortunately, while departing Canada, the Americans “burned the town 
of Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake), an act that drove the British to brutal retaliation at 
                                                 




Buffalo. These incendiary reprisals continued until Washington itself was burned by the 
British the following August.”51 Around the same time, the British did manage to regain 
some control of Lake Erie, but with limited results, leaving a U.S.-British naval stalemate 
on the Great Lakes. In the end, Britain and the United States signed a peace treaty, the 
Treaty of Ghent, and the parties signed the Rush-Bagot Pact in 1817, which “limited 
military navigation on the Great Lakes to one to two vessels per country on each lake.”52 
Ultimately, the War of 1812 fostered animosity and mistrust between Canada and the 
United States, but it also resulted in the bilateral agreements that established today’s 
existing border and the military limitations on the Great Lakes.
53
  
2. Convention of 1818 
As tensions slightly waned from the war, a convention was held in 1818 to 
formalize the border. The 1783 Treaty of Peace had identified and initial boundary, 
which stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi River. However, the treaty 
was flawed due to ambiguity over river boundaries and questions about the accuracy of 
the survey for the 45th parallel. These issues were rectified at the Convention of 1818, 
which “defined the ‘Line of Demarcation’ between the two countries as the 49th parallel 
from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains.”54 The Convention was later fine-
tuned by two subsequent treaties and a bill. First, the U.S.-Great Britain International 
Boundary Commission (IBC) was created to oversee boundary surveys and the general 
guidelines for border administration. Second, the IBC was given the responsibility to 
enforce that the border “vistas” remained clear. Third, the International Boundary 
Commission Bill specified a vista. It required the IBC to “clear from the land of any 
person such trees and underbrush as the Commission deems necessary to maintain a vista 
ten feet in width from the boundary [and] remove and destroy any work that is 
                                                 
51 The Canadian Encyclopedia, “War of 1812,” (n.d.), 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/war-of-1812, under “Wars.” 
52 U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian, “Rush-Bagot Pact of 1817 and Convention of 
1818,” (n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/Ruch-Bagot. 
53 The Canadian Encyclopedia, “War of 1812,” (n.d.), 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/war-of-1812. 
54 Peter Sullivan, David Bernhardt, and Brian Ballantyne, “The Canada-United States Boundary: The 
Next Century,” International Boundary Commission, (n.d.), 
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/docs/ibc-2009-01-eng.pdf. 
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constructed after July 6, 1960, within 10 feet of the boundary.”55 Although these 
international agreements clarified border requirements, which slowly dissolved tensions 
between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada over the long-term, they did very 
little to quell the lingering resentment between them from the War of 1812.
56
 
3. 1837: Caroline Case 
During much of the early 19th century, feelings of mistrust and animosity along 
America’s northern border remained a problem. These feelings were due to lingering 
bitterness over the War of 1812, boundary disputes, and British interference with U.S. 
shipping.
57
 In addition to the bad feelings between them, an uprising in what is now 
Toronto “proclaimed a provisional government in 1837 and sought support in upstate 
New York for the insurrection.”58 Americans were more than happy to accommodate the 
insurrection, because they hoped an “independent state to the north would open up 
economic opportunities for U.S. citizens, and some even hoped that Upper Canada would 
become part of the United States.”59 Therefore, U.S. Patriots gathered on the Navy Island 
in the Niagara River and commenced a campaign to disrupt British rule in Canada. 
Ultimately, this combination of feelings and events culminated in another conflict in 
1837, whereby the British soldiers stormed a U.S. merchant vessel (Caroline) at Navy 
Island; they scuttled, burned, and sunk the ship, killing an American citizen in the 
process. This conflict forced the governments of Great Britain and the United States to 
work out their differences through international letters, which gradually eased the strain 
between them. Thirty years later, Canada gained its independence and some of those 
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4. 1880−1946: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border 
Patrol 
After the United States and Great Britain reconciled the Caroline issue and 
Canada became a state in 1867, a long lull in U.S.-Canada border tension prevailed until 
immigration became a problem in the late 19th century. Before the 1880s most 
immigrants entered the United States through several sea ports along the East Coast, but 
American policies of the late 19th century forced immigration changes.  
As the United States began to impose more stringent immigration rules at 
its own ports of entry, even more immigrants … chose to travel via 
Canada to avoid the trouble and delay of U.S. immigrant inspection. By 
the 1890s, steamship companies began to advertise passage through 
Canada as a more desirable route for immigrants who wished to avoid 




In 1894, the American and Canadian governments made agreements to ensure that 
only legally vetted individuals would be permitted access to the United States. These 
restrictions applied to transportation by sea or rail, and the agreements allowed the U.S. 
Immigration Service to have inspectors at key locations within Canada. In 1895, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service stationed agents along the land border, and it 
began tracking individuals who received admittance through a “Certificate of 
Admission.”62 Ultimately, concerns about immigration, fueled by populist politics in an 
age of increasing economic change and distress, prompted the United States to “build and 
operate the bureaucratic machinery necessary to document the many thousands who 
entered at points along its northern border.”63 At the time, these practices were 
unprecedented, but now it is the standard approach to border control in the United States 
and, indeed, throughout the world.
64
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In the United States, concerns of illegal border crossings grew to include rum-
runners, spies, and agents-provocateurs. Prohibition actually prompted Congress to split 
the INS in order to create the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924 to handle “[i]llegal entries and 
alien smuggling.”65 More importantly, “[w]ith war brewing in Europe in the 1930s, 
immigration took on a new, prescient quality: not only was immigration a matter of 
economics, it was also becoming a matter of national security.”66 Therefore, the United 
States decided to clamp down on immigration. In 1939, the United States mandated that 
all Canadians must have passports to enter the country.
67
 The following year, the INS had 
doubled in size to meet its added wartime responsibilities, because the Canadian border 
was viewed as a problem by American political elites. President Roosevelt, who tasked 
the INS with “securing [the] borders against enemy aliens,” recognized the risks posed to 
the American people from a border environment that did little to restrict the flow of 
potential enemies into the United States.
68
  
While U.S. border restrictions were beefing up, there was also a call from the 
American people to cooperate with their northern neighbors to protect the continent 
against foreign aggressors. The outcome was the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, which 
was proposed by President Roosevelt to enhance military cooperation between the U.S. 
and Canada, and it resulted in the Permanent Defense Board.
69
 The United States 
understood the importance of a military partnership with Canada for its protection, but 
the U.S. did not fully trust Canada to effectively safeguard the shared border. Therein, 
lies the dichotomy of American security policies with Canada seen even in today’s 
modern threat environment. In fact, 1940 typifies how Americans can in one instance 
imply that Canada created a security weakness on the border, but at the same time acting 
as a friend and partner with Canada for the broader security of the region. Regardless of 
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the mixed messages sent by the Americans, there was a new sense of cooperation 
between the United States and Canada, which showed their relationship moving away 
from aggression and toward modern allies.  
B. A PERIOD OF GOOD NEIGHBORS 
For some time after World War II, Americans dissatisfied with the official 
policies and practices that led to wartime internment camps prompted a significant 
retrenchment in U.S. northern border security policies. The Displaced Persons Act of 
1948 and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 effectively forced the borders open. To the 
extent that Americans thought at all of their borders in this period, they focused on the 
southern border and the huge influx of illegal immigrants coming from Mexico. The 
northern border was almost abandoned to its own devices; while emigrants came to the 
United States by way of Canada, as a population, they did not attract much official or 
popular interest. For a few years, people, goods, and ideas easily traversed the northern 
border, which helped the United States and Canada begin their economic integration 
process and cultivate the new “continental defense” concept, significantly easing border 




1. 1947: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The first significant evidence that economic integration and trade relations were 
improving after World War II was seen at the end of the 1940s. Countries worldwide, 
realizing the economic failures of the interwar period, recognized the importance of 
international fair trade practices, which lead to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The United States and Canada were two of its initial participants. The 
GATT, under U.S. leadership, decreased trade barriers and increased economic 
partnerships among 23 countries, and it strengthened the U.S.-Canada relationship by 
fostering an advantageous economic environment along the border. In the GATT’s 
infancy, a surge of cooperation occurred between the United States and Canada, but its 
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“momentum stalled very early into the post-war economic recovery, and there was 
widespread pessimism and frustration with the GATT process throughout the 1950’s.”  
Most of that time Canada and the United States enjoyed the GATT’s mutually beneficial 
relationship, but they occasionally found that they did not see eye-to-eye on a variety of 
trade issues ranging from lumber, fish, grain, and pork to ice cream and alcohol. As these 
disputes arouse, they went before a GATT council for resolution, which as one would 
expect did not always satisfy both parties. However, for the most part, the GATT was 
responsible for improving U.S.-Canadian relations and reducing restrictions at the border. 
2. 1949: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949, with an eye toward 
stabilizing Western Europe and resisting Soviet expansion. Since its inception, NATO 
has been a collective defense organization that draws on the collective military assets and 
political processes of its members. The United States, Canada, and Great Britain were all 
founding members who wanted “a vigorous collective effort and an asymmetrical sharing 
of burdens and responsibilities.”71 Actually, at first, Canada almost did not join NATO 
even after originally suggesting its concept, because so many Canadians felt that they did 
not want to be dragged into another European conflict. Canada also felt globally secure 
due to its relative geographic isolation. However, the rising threat of communism and the 
desire to remain among the leading states of the Euro-Atlantic world kept Canada in the 
pact. In fact, Canada insisted on including language in the North Atlantic Treaty that 
ultimately became Article 2. By its terms, NATO was designed to “strengthen 
[members’] free institutions and cooperate for the general welfare” of them all.72 This 
article gave rise to habits of political consultation and internal conflict management that 
have not only preserved the alliance but also have given real traction to its cooperative, 
collective, and even integrative ambitions, as well as its capacity to expand after the 
Soviet threat disappeared. 
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Today, NATO consists of 28 independent member countries that have frequently 
shown mutual distrust, animosity and varying degrees of craftiness over the years when it 
comes to burden-shifting their security requirements, but not at the expense of the 
alliance. Wallace Thies wrote: “NATO members seek to convince their allies to accept 
burdens that they themselves prefer to avoid but cannot openly shirk for fear their 
example will be emulated by their partners, thereby jeopardizing the alliance that all 
value highly.”73 Burden-shifting is simply the way in which the NATO alliance does 
business, because it mitigates the effects of short-term policy flirtations and counteracts 
the short-attention-span problem that some countries have, namely the United States. 
However, burden-shifting can be seen as a problem sometimes. For example, although 
the Canadians have played the burden-shifting game as enthusiastically as any NATO 
member, it has occasionally affected the trust and security environment with the 
Americans along their shared border. On the other hand, strong U.S.-Canada partnerships 
were nurtured in the NATO context, which provided a strong foundation for further 
cooperation between them, specifically militarily.
74
 
3. 1951: North American Aerospace Defense Command 
The American and Canadian military cooperation, particularly in regard to 
continental defense, is most vivid in the joint U.S.-Canada efforts conducted at North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As early as 1951, the Americans 
and Canadians started consolidating their air defense systems in order to counteract the 
emerging Soviet threat. By 1957, a new level of trust was achieved between the allies 
when they agreed to integrate operational control of the air defense systems, moving 
security measures away from the shared border and pushing them out to the continental 
borders instead. The following year, NORAD was established and formalized. Periodic 
international agreements have ensured that this joint institution has remained relevant and 
in operation, and they highlight the lasting commitment shared by the two nations. For 
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example, at the onset of the 1960s, NORAD oversaw the “first continent-wide exercise” 
conducted by the allies; however, the alliance has not always been in perfect sync.
75
 
American political goals and the Canadian weariness of those goals have always 
been factored into the NORAD equation. In fact, there were times when the international 
agreements for NORAD showed explicit divergence in national security policies. For 
instance, when the NORAD Agreement was renewed in 1968, it “specifically affirmed 
that Canada would not be committed to participate in an active ballistic missile defense,” 
which was quite the opposite of what the United States wanted.
76
 However, the vast 
majority of these continental defense policies meshed cohesively together during the 
post-war period. NORAD made this level of military cooperation possible, even with 




C. COMPETING VIEWS OF BORDER RESTRICTIONS 
As the Cold War heated up, border security became a hot topic in Washington 
once again. By the mid-1950s, a movement to increase border restrictions was well 
underway. This movement was primarily in response to concerns that “post-war policies 
were letting criminal aliens, communists, subversives and organized crime figures enter 
or remain in the United States along with legitimate refugees.”78 Therefore, the American 
public sentiment, fueled by alarm and rooted in knee-jerk reactions, supported intensified 
border security efforts. As policies eventually changed in Washington, border restrictions 
were enhanced, complicating trade between the United States and Canada. Of note, this 
spike in border security slowly faded―and was nearly erased―by the end of the 
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20th century. As these border restrictions disappeared, trade improved along the border 
allowing American and Canadian economic cooperation to intermingle and thrive.
79
 
1. 1950s−1989: Tentative Economic Integration 
During the late 1950s, economic integration and trade relations continued to 
slowly strengthen. However, U.S. security concerns prompted border restrictions, 
creating tension with Canada, because hindered cross-border traffic impedes cross-border 
trade. In addition to border restrictions, tension also resulted from a lack of trade 
legislation between the allies. While the GATT did manage to decrease some trade 
barriers, there were other barriers that needed additional legislation. One example was the 
1965 Auto Pact “that allowed for greater integration of automobile production.”80 In fact, 
the Auto Pact gave a boost to the Canadian auto industry by providing greater access to 
the market; streamlined production costs for General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler who 
were working on both sides of the border; and “created a tariff-free region for automotive 
trade.”81 The Auto Pact’s only drawback was that it tied the American and Canadian 
economies more closely together by linking their fortunes in the success or failure of the 
auto industry. However, the threat of failure was minimal in 1965. At that time, the Auto 
Pact was viewed as a blessing because it rejuvenated the sluggish Canadian economy, but 
more recently the struggling U.S. auto industry was a curse for Canada, because 
American problems became Canadian problems.  
By and large, these minor trade tensions of the mid-20th century were slowly 
overcome, because of globalization that instigated increased cooperative legislation 
between the United States and Canada. John H. Sigler and Charles F. Doran wrote: 
Elements of continuity will continue to guide the formations of foreign 
policy in each polity vis-à-vis each other and the remainder of the system. 
But elements of change may predominate, not because of choice in either 
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Ottawa or Washington, but because the structure of the international 
system will not permit extensions of the status quo.
82
 
In addition, the United States gradually lost interest in northern border security, again, 
which eased border restrictions and strengthened partnerships along the shared border by 
enhancing trade for both countries. These feelings of partnership only intensified over the 
ensuing years. By the 1980s, ad-hoc agreements between the Canadians and Americans 
were formalized. In some cases, “Canadian provincial governments were invited to 
participate in regional meetings of governors such as the … Great Lakes Governors and 
the New England Governors Association … [and] in meetings of the Conference of State 
Legislators, and in the Council of State Governments.”83 Ultimately, these cooperative 
efforts coalesced into the implementation of the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade 




2. 1989: Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was designed to remove tariffs 
and enhance existing trade partnerships. In the process, both governments hoped to 
“strengthen the unique and enduring friendship between their two nations.”85 Initially, 
opponents to the agreement were concerned that it would chip-away at Canadian 
sovereignty. Some even felt that “[t]he country would lose its independence and be 
forced to adopt a wide range of policies that mirrored those of the United States.”86 In the 
long-run, the majority of Canadians understood that the FTA would strengthen their 
economy, so they willingly accepted the costs. The primary cost to the Canadians was 
vulnerability to U.S. markets, which became “more important than the domestic market 
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for many Canadian manufactures.”87 This short-term consequence was quickly overcome 
by the long-term benefit of easier access to trade with largest free-market in the world. 
Additionally, the United States benefitted from the tariff cuts because U.S. exports grew 
by 70 percent.88 Of note―even with the export increases―the importance of the FTA 
was only marginal to the United States while its criticality was hotly contested in 
Canada.89 This divergence in priorities foreshadows the role that trade came to play in 
later border security issues.  
3. 1994: North American Free Trade Agreement 
Mexico soon realized that it wanted its piece of the continental free-trade pie, so 
in 1994 the FTA was superseded by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Ratifying this agreement came with some new challenges. Canada feared 
losing some of its “preferential access” in the U.S. market, which caused the Canadians 
to fight for a trilateral agreement rather than two bilateral agreements. The Canadian 
government wanted to prevent a situation where the United States could trade with 
Canada and Mexico independently, because it would create a “hub-and-spoke situation 
that could have a negative impact on Canada’s ability to attract foreign direct 
investment.”90 In the end, NAFTA was structured as a trilateral agreement, and it resulted 
in greater integration by all its members―albeit limited in some cases―and more 
regional economic strength on the world stage.  
Although NAFTA created economic benefits, it also highlighted some security 
challenges, which came in the form of immigration and cross-border security. 
Immigration issues were primarily focused on the Mexico-U.S. border, and it was only of 
marginal concern on the Canada-U.S. border during the 1990s. This marginalization was 
due in large part to the costs associated with transportation delays for just-in-time 
production of goods. Excessive border security created barriers to efficient trade that 
                                                 
87 Condon and Sinha, Drawing Lines in Sand and Snow, 9. 
88 David R. Francis, “Canada Free Trade Agreement,” The National Bureau of Economic Research, 
(n.d.), http://www.nber.org/digest/sep01/w8293.html. 
89 Condon and Sinha, Drawing Lines in Sand and Snow, 9. 
90 Ibid., 10. 
 32 
seemed unacceptable at that time. Therefore, as NAFTA eased trade restriction between 




D. THE BORDER, FRONT AND CENTER 
The tail end of the 20th century revealed the U.S.-Canada border at its height of 
bi-national cooperation. Antipathy between the allies seemed to be a thing of the past. 
Instead, the United States and Canada wrestled with different approaches to bring their 
two countries closer together. Open trade and security partnerships, with some 
exceptions, were the order of the day. Therefore, a number of international agreements 
were instituted for the benefit of both economies, but these agreements lacked teeth. For 
the most part, these international agreements were just words, because they did not have 
the full support of both governments behind them. However, most of the agreements 
were measured steps toward a more open and cooperative border. Then the terror attacks 
of 2001 occurred and everything changed, again. 
1.  1995: Shared Border Accord 
The 1995 Shared Border Accord was signed by the United States and Canada to 
reduce the border security burden on the allies. It was designed to “create a border that 
[was] flexible enough to accommodate our economic interests and permit … the health 
and safety of our citizens.”92 In addition, the accord delineated the commitments of both 
governments in support of this cooperative goal. They agreed to preserve the shared 
border’s “open character while protecting [the] communities.”93 The allies also wanted to 
enhance their partnership while ensuring fiscal responsibility to their citizenry. Clearly, 
there was a joint desire to alleviate trade barriers and a willingness to accept some 
vulnerability to that end. Most of the remaining international agreements of the late 1990s 
served the same purpose.
94
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2. 1996: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
One reform, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, attempted to increase immigration restrictions to the United States. The Act was in 
response to intense political pressure from American constituents concerned with 
inadequate immigration policies during a recession. The Act was intended to maintain 
records of the flow of individuals crossing U.S. borders, and it was designed to “provide 
evidence that individuals deported for felony crimes had actually left the country, and 
could subsequently be denied re-entry.”95 The reality of the Act turned out to be much 
different. It imposed identification requirements that slowed traffic at border crossings. 
These requirements seemed at odds with the principles proposed by NAFTA and the 
1995 Shared Border Accord, which resulted in a negative response from the Canadians. 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ultimately 
prompted Ottawa to push for a series of bilateral talks between the United States and 
Canada that would enhance trade policies and limit further restrictions.
96
 
3. 1997: Border Vision Initiative and Cross-Border Crime Forum 
In 1997, Canada attempted to pacify U.S. concerns regarding immigration reform 
by instituting new Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) programs. Two of these 
programs were the Border Vision Initiative and the Cross-Border Crime Forum, which 
were both coordinated with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Border 
Vision Initiative was intended “to increase cooperation and intelligence exchanges for 
combating illegal migration.”97 In support of that initiative, the Cross-Border Crime 
Forum (CBCF) facilitated law enforcement partnerships between the United States and 
Canada to “address transnational crime issues such as organized crime, counter-terrorism, 
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smuggling, economic crime and other emerging cross-border threats.”98 Participants in 
the CBCF ran the gambit of crime fighting entities from local law enforcement to federal 
agencies on both sides of the border, and the Cross-Border Crime Forum included the 
previously untested concept of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in its program. 
Although experimental in 1997, these IBETs have become an essential component of 
modern organized crime fighting operations, and they have resulted in innovative 
collaboration models and sophisticated investigation techniques that span the shared 
border. Each of these programs bolstered international cooperative efforts through 
institutional partnerships, which continued to be enhanced by additional programs in the 
following years. 
4. 1999: Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum 
The Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum (CUSP) was a joint effort that was put forth 
by American and Canadian policy makers in 1999. Its purpose was to help foster 
dialogue between the two countries on a variety of border management issues. The CUSP 
conducted two meetings in 2000 that provided a lot of ideas, but limited cooperative 
results. These “meetings were unprecedented for the U.S.-Canada border in terms of the 
number and variety of senior leaders from the public and private sector who participated 
and the integrated approach taken to border issues.”99 Some of the border management 
topics of interest included: standardization policies, the application of resources, new 
technologies such as smart-cards, limitations on transportation network efficiencies, the 
proper placement of enforcement activities, the application of risk management 
techniques, and the concept of a “common perimeter.” As a result of the meetings, the 
CUSP identified four primary objectives:
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1. CUSP should meet on a recurring basis in order to foster partnerships and assess 
mutual progress made. 
2. Cooperation between agencies should increase and best practices need to be 
identified and implemented. 
3. Policies need to be assessed by governments in order to determine inefficiencies. 
4. Legislation needs to be enacted that ensures proper resource allocation and bi-
national cooperation. 
Unfortunately, the CUSP Forum was unable to meet its first objective, because after the 
two meetings the program ended.
101
 
Two Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum meetings did not constitute a successful 
program, but they did provide a pit stop on the road to future bi-national efforts. Like so 
many well-intentioned programs, the commitment and interest in the CUSP Forum waned 
until it was ultimately replaced. This was a great example of how federal programs have 
failed to provide long-term solutions to the shared border even though concerns over 
border cooperation and security endure. The demise of programs such as the Canada-US 
Partnership Forum may foreshadow fading American interest and the evaporation of 
federal resources needed for border security in the future. It also suggests the need for 
other institutions to pick up the mantle of cooperative security at the shared border. 
E. POST-9/11 PERIOD: THE PRIMACY OF AMERICAN SECURITY 
American and Canadian border security priorities instantly changed after the 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States. Efforts to ease trade across the shared border 
abruptly ceased while the United States took a hard look at its security vulnerabilities. 
Not to be seen as part of the problem, Canada initially jumped on the American security-
first bandwagon, but Canadians soon tired of the border restrictions that were impeding 
trade. In addition, Canadians were not happy with the treatment that they received at the 
hands of the aggressive and sometimes antagonistic American security establishment. 
Therefore, the Canadians began to step back from their border security posture and 
refocus their efforts on easing trade restrictions with the United States again. Americans, 
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on the other hand, seemed willing to forgo efficient trade with Canada in order to satisfy 
what it considered border security weaknesses. By 2005, some efforts were made to 
revitalize cross-border cooperation, but a lack of commitment by both parties permitted 
the efforts to stall. At the time, Americans were still not ready to loosen their border 
security grip, which continued to frustrate the Canadians who wanted trade restrictions 
reduced. Finally, ten years after the terror attacks, Americans were willing to come to the 
table in earnest to reestablish stronger economic partnerships with Canada. Although 
border security concerns were still the priority for the United States, a subtle shift toward 
minimizing trade restrictions was beginning. 
1. 2001: Smart Border Declaration 
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Smart Border Declaration, another jointly 
sponsored government initiative was institutionalized. The Canadian and American 
border czars of the time quickly drew-up a proposal that consisted of four pillars. These 
included securing the flow of people, goods, and infrastructures while improving 
information sharing and coordination between the two countries. There was also a robust 
30-point action plan associated with the declaration that covered a wide range of topics 
from biometrics to integrated intelligence and joint training exercises.  Andre Belelieu, an 
author for the Center for the Strategic and International Studies, suggested that the 
“bilateral agreement instantly became the de facto framework for ensuring the world’s 
longest undefended border remained secure, while facilitating the flow of people, goods, 
and services, and was a key component in the larger homeland security goal of creating a 
zone of confidence against terrorist activity, while causing minimal damage to the 
world’s largest trading relationship.”102 
Several American and Canadian legislative bills were passed that the Smart 
Border Declaration supported. In the United States, the Patriot Act was enacted and 
whose purpose was stated “to enable law enforcement officials to track down and punish 
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those responsible for the attacks and to protect against any similar attacks.”103 In addition, 
the U.S. established the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002. Canada mimicked some of the U.S. legislation by passing the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act. These Canadian Acts gave 
“Ottawa and police agencies new powers to deport, detain and prosecute citizens and 
non-citizens based on police suspicion of their ethnic background and association with 
immigrant communities.”104 In both countries these Acts were highly contested, but still 
enforced. Unfortunately, the Smart Border Declaration was not up to the task to support 
these new Acts, so it did not last. The momentum faded for the declaration due to 
changing governmental leadership, newly developed security initiatives, and questionable 
intelligence sharing techniques. In the end, the Smart Border Declaration fizzled out and 
was reinvented as the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP).
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2. 2002: Cooperative Backsliding Due to the Arar Case 
Probably the single most detrimental event that tested the partnership and 
commitment to modern security practices between the U.S. and Canada was the Maher 
Arar case. The knee-jerk legislation of 2001 to 2002 enacted by both countries 
contributed to the circumstances surrounding the case because they provided the 
framework for the U.S. apprehension of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen. In 2002, Arar 
was detained at New York’s Kennedy Airport by INS agents as he returned home to 
Montreal from vacation in Tunisia. At the time, the United States suspected Arar of 
terrorist affiliations, so he was deported to the Middle East, not to the American’s close 
ally―Canada. Regrettably, Arar was detained and allegedly tortured over the next year 
and finally released in 2003 after signing a false confession.  
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Three aspects of the Arar case highlight some of the border security challenges 
that both governments faced as a result of 9/11. First, Canadian civil liberties came into 
question due to new American legislation. Canadians feared that the U.S. would “use its 
new array of police, investigative, and immigration powers to deport naturalized 
Canadian citizens back to their birthplace, without consulting the Canadian government 
until it is a fait accompli.”106 Second, the Americans proved their willingness to send 
Canadians to countries “well known for torturing their prisoners,” which did not sit well 
with their citizens.
107
 Third, and most poignant, the United States clearly did not trust the 
Canadians to effectively deal with security risks themselves. The combination of these 
factors proved distrust existed between the allies, and they revealed how precarious the 
U.S.-Canada border security relationship had become. These factors also exposed the 
nature of American politics at the time, which was to act on security first and then ask 
questions later. Unquestionably, the Arar case would cast doubt on all subsequent 
American security policies along the U.S.-Canada border.
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3. 2005: Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
In 2005, the leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States endorsed a trilateral 
initiative called the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Although it 
was never a formally signed agreement, it did create an additional forum for cooperation 
in addition to NAFTA and update the Smart Border Declaration. The purpose of the SPP 
program was to improve cooperative security measures while enhancing economic 
commitments between the members. The SPP met annually from 2005 to 2009 to discuss 
its mandates, assess progress, and revise its goals. For example, the 2007 SPP summit 
identified five priorities that included: (1) Enhancement of the Global Competitiveness of 
North America, (2) Safe Food and Products, (3) Sustainable Energy and the Environment, 
(4) Smart and Secure Borders, and (5) Emergency Management and Preparedness. Obviously, 
some of these goals were covered under previous plans, but as those plans disappeared, this one 
took their place. In some cases, the states acted individually to implement targeted 
                                                 




infrastructure improvements under the auspices of the SPP. Again however, even after the 
declared commitment to the initiative by each of the countries, the program just evaporated 
with the changing political tides in 2009.
109
 
4. 2011: Beyond the Border 
Contemporary U.S.-Canada border security is characterized by Beyond the Border: A 
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, which is the most recent 
action plan initiated. In 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper declared that 
Americans and Canadians “share responsibility for the safety, security, and resilience of the 
United States and of Canada in an increasingly integrated and globalized world. [They] intend 
to address security threats at the earliest point possible in a manner that respects privacy, civil 
liberties, and human rights.”110 The plan focuses on five key areas, which include: addressing 
threats early; trade facilitation, economic growth, and jobs; cross-border law enforcement; 
critical infrastructure and cyber-security; and managing our new long-term partnership. All of 
these areas have been addressed in previous plans, but the difference is the new primacy of the 
trade relationship along the border, which is more in line with Canada’s border goals.  
The Canadians have long considered the facilitation of trade to be the most important 
aspect of the U.S.-Canada border partnership. The Americans have taken a different approach 
to border security. The U.S. has spent a decade determined to lockdown border security by 
throwing inordinate amounts of resources at the issue. In today’s fiscally restrained 
environment, the United States can no longer operate in this manner. Therefore, the 2011 
Beyond the Border declaration indicates a changing of the tide, at least for the Americans. 
The plan reveals an American retrenchment from its previous border security policies. 
Essentially, under the auspices of a perimeter approach to security, both federal 
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governments’ security strategic goals are becoming more aligned by shifting their 
resources and/or priorities away from direct border security and toward trade. 
An important question remains for the latest bi-national border security plan. Will 
it be lost amid ever changing political wills or in response to fickle public opinion? Many 
of the previous plans have not endured due to an uncommitted populous and inconsistent 
politics. Maybe Beyond the Border will last, because there are several initiatives 
presently underway. On the other hand, many past initiatives have been started that do 
not gain permanent traction. Either way―one thing is for certain―there is currently a 
robust action plan in effect that is pushing border security focus away from the shared 
border and emphasizing the enhancement of economic prosperity between the two 
countries.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the history of the U.S.-Canada border there has been one consistent 
theme, the border relationship ebbs and flows, but generally it tends to become more 
cooperative in nature. Periods of animosity have been replaced by periods of cooperation 
more than once. These border relationship fluctuations were often the result of an 
unpredictable American security response to some world event, which forced Canada to 
react in kind. The military, immigration, and trade have all played a role in these 
fluctuations. Each time one of these events occurs, the two countries seem to improve on 
their existing partnerships overall. The security-first mindset used by many in 
Washington today is only the latest example of a fluctuation in that border security 
relationship. However, the most recent U.S.-Canadian international agreement, Beyond 
the Border, may signal the beginning of a new period in reduced border restrictions 
between the allies. Regardless, if history is any indicator for the future, it is only a matter 
of time before the U.S.-Canada border is fully open for business again. 
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III. CANADA PREFERS TRADE 
We have addressed … threats to our society in a way that has strengthened 
the open nature of our country―open to immigrants from around the 
world and respectful of differences among us. Our prosperity is directly 
linked to this openness and to our ability to flourish in an increasingly 
interdependent world. 
―Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin (2004)111 
For 200 years, the Canadians have been dealing with frequent and sometimes jarring 
policy shifts from their southern neighbor as the United States jostles between security 
interests and trade priorities. Canadian policymakers have become experts at riding out these 
American policy storms. Over the long-term, Canadian policy elites have inched their way 
toward better trade relations by cleverly leveraging burden-shifting techniques to the benefit 
of all those who reside along the border, American northern states included. 
Even in the aftermath of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, which profoundly 
impacted Canadians and Americans alike, the initial focus on stepped-up security has once 
again slowly given way to new and stronger trade partnerships between the two countries. 
Initially, the Canadians were torn between showing solidarity with the American people by 
supporting tighter border security initiatives and interjecting their own views of the critical 
importance of efficient trade to their own economy. Eventually supporting American security 
policies won the day, but “[t]he political scramble to ‘do something’ about leaky borders … 
slowed and complicated North American economic integration.”112 Canadians soon tired of 
the inconvenience, expense, and overall burden that the border had become. Once again, 
Canadians pushed the United States to make trade more seamless along the shared border, 
which has contributed to more cost-effective and integrated systems becoming 
institutionalized between them. Today it appears that their efforts have paid off, because 
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the United States has begun to forgo some of its more stringent security policies in the 
interest of greater trade relations with Canada. 
A. CANADIAN BORDER SECURITY NEED 
[A]s I have said before, a threat to the United States is a threat to Canada, 
to our trade, to our interests, to our values, and to our common 
civilization. 
—Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2011)113 
The last decade has proven difficult for the Canadian government, because it has 
struggled to determine the correct level of security to administer along the U.S.-Canada 
border. Canada’s border security problems began in the days directly following the terror 
attacks, but they continue today. Initially, Canada was forced to succumb to intrusive 
American security controls, which essentially locked down the border. Eventually, people 
and commerce began to flow again, and Canada resumed hope that the worst of the border 
security issues were behind them. That is until the 9/11 Commission Report “recommended 
that security along the Canadian and Mexican borders be tightened.”114  
The 9/11 Commission Report forced Canada to reevaluate its border security dealings 
with the United States. From that point on, Canada has worked with its U.S. ally to improve 
the security situation along the shared border. Security posts on both sides on the border that 
once stood empty were manned and controlled. In addition, new Canadian institutions were 
created to manage expanding border priorities. Eventually, several bilateral agreements took 
shape to deal with the trade concerns growing in both countries, but they stalled. Throughout 
this time, Canadians were basically dragged along the American security path while trying 
desperately to understand it. One Canadian scholar remarked, “American policy toward its 
northern neighbor has been hard to label in the post-9/11 period.”115 
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Today, border management policies are a predominant issue among Canada’s 
citizenry and policymakers alike. They argue about how much border security is appropriate 
and whether supporting American security policies is in Canada’s best interest. Most believe 
that prudence dictates cooperation with U.S. border security policies, because it is better to be 
seen as part of the solution rather than part of the problem. On the other hand, Canadians also 
believe that a balance must be found with Americans regarding cumbersome border security 
measures that do little more than impede efficient trade. Ultimately, Canadian policymakers 
have felt obligated to support many of the security policies put forth by their ally to the south. 
However, the priority for average Canadian citizens―most of whom reside somewhere along 
the border―want security to take a backseat to trade, because it is the lifeblood of their 
economy. 
1. Security Policy Conflicts among Canadian Elites 
If trade is critical to the Canadian government, how is the current administration 
affecting border security? Essentially, there are two schools of thought that appear to be in 
direct contradiction. First, there are Canadians who argue that increased border security 
equals decreased efficiency in trade. Second, there are Canadians who argue that increased 
security does not negatively affect trade. 
Increasing border security results in decreased trade is the more widely accepted 
viewpoint. Many Canadians fear that if Canada succumbs to the American security-first 
mentality, then the result would be border restrictions that slow trade with their largest 
trading partner, the United States. Alexander Moens and Nachum Gabler highlight these 
concerns: 
The negative consequences from 9/11 have become deeply entrenched and 
have led to a new ‘security-first’ orientation that now permeates most 
branches of the US government, notably the Department of Homeland 
Security, and has widely infused itself into the mindset of elected 




                                                 
116 Alexander Moens and Nachum Gabler, “The Costs of the Canada-US Border,” Fraser Forum, 
January/February 2012, 25. 
 44 
They go on to argue that these types of policies lead to “border thickening,” which is “the 
phenomenon whereby national borders become increasingly impermeable to travelers and 
commercial shippers as a result of multiple layers of security enhancing procedures.”117 
Ultimately, they suggest that if trade slows, it becomes less efficient and more expensive 
to move goods and people between the two countries.  
Another author with similar viewpoints to those of Moens and Gabler is Daniel 
Drache. For many Canadians, his assessment sums-up the border security situation:  
[T]he border is expected to operate like a Kevlar vest, stopping everything 
in its path, without hindering the free movement of goods and services. 
What an abrupt turnaround from an age of free trade when openness was 
everything and security only a secondary consideration. Of course, it can’t 
be both, a security-tight border and a border geared for commerce with 




Some Canadians argue that increased border security has a negligible effect on trade with 
the United States. In fact, Michael Burt conducted a study that indicated that even with 
increased border security there was “no significant effect on trade volumes” between the 
two countries.
119
 However, he does admit that “any higher costs associated with increased 
security appear to be being borne by businesses,” which of course translates into higher 
costs to consumers and a decrease in demand for the goods.
120
 
Regardless of the costs, some Canadians maintain the premise that “security is a 
top priority.”121 Danielle Goldfarb and William Robson, are chief among them: 
The border will only remain open if U.S. leaders know that Canada treats 
the security of Americans no less seriously than it treats the security of 
Canadians. The federal government should announce loudly and 
unequivocally that maintaining a free flow of goods across the Canada-
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U.S. border is an integral part of its efforts to enhance North American 
physical and economic security.122 
Even though this viewpoint has less popular support, it is the current Canadian 
government’s position to support American security interests. This position accomplishes 
two things. It acknowledges and acts upon American concerns for the need of increased 
border security, which ultimately fosters stronger trade ties with the United States. 
2. Canada’s Focus on Trade 
Our government’s top priority is the economy―creating jobs, growth and 
long-term prosperity for Canadian workers, businesses and families. 
―Canadian Minister of International Trade Ed Fast (2012)123 
Canada’s economy has been highly dependent on trade with the United States for 
a long time, which is why so much of the political interaction that takes place between 
Canada and the United States centers on it. In fact, according to Daniel Drache, 
“Canadian governments have always treated border politics first and foremost as a 
pragmatic issue, as a means to provide access to the U.S. market.”124 That is why 
September 11, 2001, has had such a profound impact on Canadian policymakers. These 
policy elites have had to embrace American border security interests that were in direct 
contradiction to many of the border policies employed since NAFTA was signed between 
the allies. Throughout the past decade, Canada has attempted to regain the pre-9/11 
border efficiencies, but American unilateralism has given way to more and more border 
security requirements. Canadians have responded―often with disapproval―but have 
ultimately given in to American pressures in this regard. But how long would Canadians 
continue to accept this arrangement? 
There was a combination of events that took place soon after 9/11 that revealed a 
growing disparity between Canadian and American border policies. In 2004, Drache 
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claimed that a “highly visible strategic and ideological gap has opened between the two 
neighbors.”125 The first event was the Maher Arar case in 2002, which challenged the 
Canadian’s civil liberties and sovereignty, and it revealed that American political elites 
did not trust Canada with their security. The second event was more cumulative in nature. 
It resulted from increasingly insufferable border impediments that slowed the movement 
of goods and people across the border, thereby raising costs to businesses and consumers 
which hindered the Canadian economy. Steven Globerman and Paul Storer claimed: 
The available evidence on costs has tended to focus on the direct and 
indirect consequences of longer and less predictable waiting times for 
shipments to cross from Canada into the United States. Longer waiting 
times contribute to increased expenditures on variable inputs such as fuel 




These events caused ripple effects throughout the Canadian economy, which were 
only exacerbated by the 2008 economic crisis that affected both sides of the shared 
border. The culmination of these events and Washington’s developing interest in “a more 
efficient border” demanded policy action by Canadian elites.127 Therefore, Canadian 
policymakers seized upon the opportunity to “[initiate] a new perimeter security 
agreement with the United States to reduce the impediments to border flows and improve 
trade.”128 
Today, Canadians have embraced globalization, which has opened up new 
opportunities for trade in other parts of the world. In fact, Canada has begun to forge new 
trade alliances in Asia and the Americas. Canada’s lead institution for developing 
economic strategy, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 
is looking outward “beyond [the] borders for economic opportunities that serve to grow 
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Canada’s trade and investment.”129 At present, DFAIT is undertaking an ambitious 
Global Commerce Strategy that focuses on creating free trade agreements with countries 
around the world, and DFAIT is committed to “[s]ecure and deepen the commercial 
relationship with the United States through enhanced advocacy and management of trade 
irritants.”130 These ambitious plans and strategies have drawn the United States out of its 
security-first shell and back to the bargaining table. Hence the result, the 2011 Beyond the 
Border action plan. 
B. CANADIAN STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS 
Until fairly recently Canadians did not have a published security policy. Today 
there are many strategies that Canadians employ to express their concerns for security. 
While they make a good showing of plans to manage today’s cantankerous threat 
environment, they are little more than words. A decade ago―directly after the 9/11 terror 
attacks―these documents may have been more fervently supported, but now the 
Canadian emphasis is focused on ensuring trade flows as unencumbered as possible while 
security is molded appropriately to support this effort. It is true that Canadians have 
created new security bureaucracies, supported numerous security initiatives, and 
continually discuss new ideas and the importance of border security with their American 
counterparts in Washington, but most of these actions are fairly hollow in practice. 
Ultimately, Canadians do what they must to keep trade moving.  
1. The Canadian Security and Trade Strategies 
The Canadian security and trade strategies reveal a government struggling to 
figure out how to exert its power over uncharted territory that has been nearly 
monopolized by the United States in all the years leading up to September 11, 2001. On 
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the other hand, Canada’s trade strategies are robust, at least in terms of regional trade 
concerns. 
a. Canada’s National Security Policy (2004) 
Ottawa’s security policies, similar to Washington’s strategies, are 
multilayered. Each one building on ideas and principles derived from Canada’s first 
National Security Policy. Written in 2004, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National 
Security Policy “articulates core national security interests and proposes a framework for 
addressing threats to Canadians.”131 In addition, Canada’s National Security Policy was 
“crafted to balance the needs for national security with the protection of core Canadian 
values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties,” which sounds a lot like 
balancing open trade with security.
132
 
The policy also mentions several key measures, one of which is border 
security. Front and center in the first paragraph of the Border Security Chapter is their 
border priority. It states “Management of our borders is in keeping with the need to 
facilitate trade and travel, while preventing high-risk travelers and cargo from entering 
Canada through air, land, and marine ports.”133 This statement implies that security is 
subject to the efficiency of trade, which is at odds with American border priorities. The 
United States firmly considers security the priority, but trade has certainly grown in 
importance recently as seen in the U.S.-Canada 2011 Beyond the Border action plan. 
Either way, this document does acknowledge Canada’s commitment to border security. 
Oddly, the Canada’s 2004 national security policy has yet to be updated. 
What does this omission indicate about Canada’s concern for border security? It could be 
interpreted that Canada wanted to appear determined to support U.S. security policies of 
the time, but complete inaction to update the Canada’s security policy for nine years 
suggests that its importance as a policy is minimal at best. Otherwise, Canadian 
                                                 





policymakers would find the time to ensure its relevance in an ever changing threat 
environment. Therefore, this document was written to placate U.S. security concerns of 
the day, and not much more. 
b. Advantage Canada (2006) 
Canada’s economic strategy titled Advantage Canada: Building a Strong 
Economy for Canadians “is a strategic, long-term economic plan designed to improve 
[the] country’s economic prosperity both today and in the future.134 Canada’s economic 
strategy was written two years after its national security strategy but two years before the 
country produced a defense strategy. This fact highlights Canada’s priority of economics 
over security. 
Canadian economic concerns are particularly focused on the facilitation of 
efficient and open trade with the United States. Canada’s economic strategy states: 
Strategically located gateways and border crossings play a vital role in 
fostering Canada’s competitiveness. The bulk of our trade with the rest of 
the world flows through a number of key gateways and border crossings. 
For example, 28 per cent of merchandise shipments between Canada and 
the United States pass through the Windsor-Detroit Corridor … Our 
national economy―and our ability to compete and succeed on the world 




The Advantage Canada policy underscores how Canada sees its national economy as a 
key aspect of its national health and, arguably, its national security. It also traces the 
contours of the disagreement on this point between Canadian and American views. Trade 
and security are not in opposition in the Canadian perspective, but Canada and the United 
States might be if Washington continues to disregard the serious ramifications that its 
post-9/11 border policies have had. 
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c. Canada First: Defence Strategy (2008) 
Two years after staking its claim to the primacy of trade concerns, Canada 
produced the Canada First Defence Strategy, intended to be a 20-year plan for the 
Canadian forces. The goal of the Canadian defense strategy is to combine a “state-of-the-
art military” and its industry into a powerhouse that can deliver security “within Canada, 
North America and globally.”136 The strategy states: 
[It] will enable the Forces to meet the Government’s commitments and 
address the full range of [defense] and security challenges facing Canada 
now and into the future. This strengthened military will translate into 
enhanced security for Canadians at home as well as a stronger voice for 
Canada on the world stage.
137
 
Lastly, the defense strategy is meant to be complementary to Canada’s trade strategy 
(Advantage Canada), and it is meant to “help position Canadian companies for success in 
the global marketplace.”138 According to the Canada First Defence Strategy, “Its 
infusion of long-term, stable funding will … make better use of investments in capital 
and technology, and become more effective players in the supply chains of the world’s 
primary defense equipment manufacturers.”139 Ultimately, Canada’s defense strategy 
reveals a sustained interest in improved state and regional security. Part of that security 
will be accomplished through industry and stronger trade practices. 
d. Beyond the Border Action Plan (2011) 
In 2011, Canada managed to combine its security and economic concerns 
into one document. The document, Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter 
Security and Economic Competitiveness, was a joint effort by the United States and 
Canada. Each head of state pronounced their long-term commitment to “working 
together, not just at the border, but beyond the border to enhance our security and 
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accelerate the legitimate flow of people, goods and services.”140 The Canadians have 
been waiting a decade for the Beyond the Border action plan, because it signals a shift in 
border priorities by the United States. While security is still the priority within 
Washington, trade has certainly gained importance. Ultimately, this action plan bodes 
well for Canadians who emphatically desire the efficient movement of trade above all 
else. 
2. Canada’s Border Security Institutions 
Canada’s border security institutions are the Canada Border Services Agency, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Coast Guard. These institutions 
contribute to the U.S.-Canada Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET). They work 
in conjunction with U.S. agencies like the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the local and state American 
police forces. According to the Canada-United States IBET Threat Assessment 2010, 
“These multi-agency intelligence-led enforcement teams augment the integrity and 
security of the border by identifying, investigating and interdicting individuals and 
organizations that pose a threat to the security of both nations.”141 Even if Canada’s 
primary concern is trade along the border, they have supported U.S. border security 
priorities by cooperating with American security institutions along the border, but not to 
the same level as their U.S. counterparts. 
a. Canada Border Services Agency 
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created to show and act 
upon the Canadian’s need to be seen doing something along the border shortly after the 
9/11 terror attacks, and today it is one of Canada’s leading agencies involved in the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams with the United States. The agency began in 
earnest in 2003 by combining three of Canada’s previous organizations (customs, 
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immigration, and food/plant/animal inspection). The CBSA was mandated to administer 
“integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and 
facilitate the free flow of persons and goods.”142 As of 2012, the CBSA employed 
approximately 13,000 people that operated at land border crossings, airports, marine 
ports, and rail sites. They denied more than 50,000 people entry into Canada that same 
year. Interestingly, the CBSA reports to Public Safety Canada, which also began in 2003. 
Public Safety Canada is similar to the Department of Homeland Security in the United 
States, because it “was created … to ensure coordination across all federal departments 
and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians.”143 
There is clearly a correlation between the terror attacks in 2001 and 
Canada’s need for the CBSA. But is Canada’s need for the institution as strong today as it 
was in 2003? Probably not, but in order to prove that Canadians remain committed to 
border security with the Americans the institution will remain relevant. 
b. Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is an integral part of 
Canada’s national security framework. As a national police force, much of their focus is 
geared toward public safety throughout the provinces of Canada, along the U.S.-Canada 
border, and on the Great Lakes. The RCMP’s  responsibilities “include: national security 
criminal investigations, protective policing, border integrity, critical infrastructure 
protection, marine security, air carrier protection, critical incident management and a host 
of related support services.”144 One of the RCMP’s top priorities is terrorism, and it 
attempts to “prevent, detect, deny and respond to criminal activity in relation to national 
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security with the primary focus of gathering evidence for criminal prosecution.”145 
Finally, the RCMP contributes to the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, which offer 
bi-national support that helps to accomplish its missions. 
c. Canadian Coast Guard 
The Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for maritime security and 
enforcement along Canada’s thousands of miles of coastline and throughout the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system. The Coast Guard partners with the RCMP and 
the Department of National Defence for the Marine Security Operation Centers in their 
areas of responsibility. In addition, they “help detect, assess and support the response to 
any threat to marine security that could affect the safety, security, environment or 
economy” of Canada.146 The Canadian Coast Guard is an active member of the Shiprider 
Program, which Secretary Napolitano has characterized as “a critical security partnership 
between the United States and Canada, improving our cross-border operations.”147 
Ultimately, the Canadian Coast Guard is a highly integrated component of the Canadian 
maritime team, and it helps boost cooperation between the United States and Canada on 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. 
C. CANADIAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
Like Pavlov’s dogs, Canada has been trained to react to American unilateralist 
policy shifts. This response―however it plays out in Canada―has allowed the country to 
reap great rewards, because it is the largest trading partner with the most powerful 
economy in the world. In effect, Canada’s political elites have willingly bowed to 
American security whims in order to keep this esteemed arrangement going. At least it 
appears that way on the surface.  
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Canadian acquiescence is not without dissent. There are many who would gladly 
alter the security implementation policies to something more in line with Canadian 
interests and less akin to American priorities. Regardless, today’s Canadian political 
elites have decided to align themselves with American security policies in hopes of 
strong ongoing trade partnerships and future economic rewards. Therefore, Canadians 
deal with the United States through continentalism, because America is its largest trading 
partner. Interestingly, a shift in Canadian policy has begun whereby Canadians are 




The current Canadian government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, could 
be characterized as administering policy through the lens of continentalism. The joint 
effort between the United States and Canada to create a security perimeter around the two 
countries that benefits them both is an example of this policy. However, his government 
is also looking outside the United States for future trading partners. Ultimately, a 
Canadian foreign policy scholar, David Haglund, summed up Canada’s policy strategy 
when he argued “that Canadian policy-makers since 1945 have sought to embed the 
country’s ‘America policy’ within the broader confines of an internationalist agenda that 
could only be realized through the appropriation of American power to Canadian 
ends.”149 
Continentalism is only half of Canada’s policy implementation strategy. The other 
half is more burden-shifting in nature―a habit learned in the decades of Canadian 
involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization―since the NATO alliance took 
form in response to the emerging Cold War threats. According to Martial Foucault and 
Frédéric Mérand: 
Presitige benefits are accrued when the act of contributing more than 
expected provides political capital and bargaining power in an 
organization. For example, Canada’s ambitious strategy in Afghanistan 
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has in part been shaped by the government’s desire to punch above its 




Not only has Canada been a major contributor to the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan, 
but it has also willingly accepted American policies for increased border security. The 
Canadians have even beefed up their own border security standards since September 11, 
2001, by establishing the Canada Border Service Agency that employs over 7,000 
officers that are stationed along the border today.
151
 In other words, the Canadian’s 
burden-shifting tactic in this case is to placate U.S. security concerns at the border and 
abroad in hopes of gaining bargaining strength with Washington regarding reducing 
barriers to trade. This tactic appears to be working because the Beyond the Border action 
plan has started to lift some of the barriers to trade that initially sprang up in response to 
the terror attacks by “[r]educing the administrative and paperwork burden on Canadian 
businesses … which are the backbone of [their] economy.”152 
Not all Canadians buy into the idea that Canada is burden-shifting at the U.S.-
Canada border. In fact, concepts such as burden-sharing, burden-shifting, and free-riding 
could be considered dirty words in some Canadian policy circles. Stéfanie von Hlatky 
and Jessica N. Trisko sum up this position best: 
Canada does not simply undertake symbolic actions to minimize potential 
criticism from the United States. Neither does Canada shirk its 
responsibilities at the border. Rather, Canada-U.S. co-operation regarding 
border security is best explained in terms of an ongoing process of interest 
harmonization and a growing recognition that economic and security 
concerns at the border are two sides of the same coin.
153
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There is a flaw in their argument. What do they mean by “interest harmonizing?”154 This 
turn of phrase is just a different way of saying burden-shifting. 
In an attempt to remain relevant in the national security arena, Canadians have 
upped their support for American security interests in hopes of gaining political capital in 
Washington; even if doing so does not necessarily coincide with Canadian trade interests. 
In fact, Canada’s recent involvement in the Middle East supports this claim. No matter 
how one characterizes Canada’s shift toward border security, it is still the same thing 
because it was caused by a need to keep trade moving as freely as possible. In other 
words, it means supporting American security initiatives that increase border restrictions. 
If the United States did not expect a certain degree of support from their northern 
neighbors, would Canada have enacted security policies and created institutions that 
contribute to “thickening’ of the border?”155 Of course not, because the free flow of trade 
was and is Canada’s priority. Essentially, Canadians would have maintained the status 
quo, not increased border restrictions on their own accord. 
Ultimately, burden-shifting has been a part of Canadian foreign policy for 
decades, and there is no reason to assume that this practice will not continue. Recent 
proof abounds in the Canadian restructuring and realigning of their national security 
establishments in the hopes of currying favor with their American allies. Canadians know 
that sacrifices must be made to ensure that trade will flow at the border. They also know 
that efficiency can be improved upon with time. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Canadian’s steadfast commitment to economic prosperity through North 
American partnerships has helped them trudge through waves of perplexing American 
security policies that in many Canadians’ view have done little more than interfere with 
trade at the shared border. In an effort to minimize the damage caused by U.S. unilateral 
security policies, Canadian policymakers have aligned themselves with Washington elites 
by administering security policies and creating institutions that reflect American interests. 
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However, this is not simple acquiescence; it is cleverly disguised burden-shifting. While 
appearing to submit to American security impulses, the Canadians have slowly created a 
bureaucracy that acknowledges U.S. interests but furthers Canadian priorities. Over the 
last decade, Canada has slowly marched toward greater economic integration by reducing 
barriers to trade through policies like Beyond the Border. Today, Canadians are once 
again enjoying a more efficient border atmosphere thanks to their patients, burden-
shifting tactics, and willingness to overcome the Americans’ security-first mindset. The 
Americans are benefiting from these policy tactics as well, particularly American states 
directly along the border. But will this new border security trend that is so important to 
Canadians―and Americans too―last? Probably not, especially if another threat to U.S. 
national security is perceived by Americans to have been the result of waning security 






















IV. SECURITY-FIRST IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Northern Border Strategy provides a unifying framework for the 
Department’s work focused on enhancing the security and resiliency along 
our northern border while expediting travel and trade with Canada. 
—DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano (June 5, 2012)156 
The terror attacks of 9/11 terrified Americans into believing that they needed to 
clamp down on border security in order to feel safe. It caused fears of terrorist cells, 
biological weapons, WMDs, and countless unknown threats, which were possibly lurking 
just north of the U.S.-Canada border. Therefore, the American public was in a frenzy to 
lock down the northern border, regardless of the costs. In the process, the Canadians were 
dragged along with Washington’s jarring policy shifts. Over the remainder of the decade, 
the Americans’ hot blood slowly cooled, which in recent times has given way to easing 
border restrictions. However, make no mistake about it, Americans still crave security 
above all else. 
A. THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE WITH SECURITY AND TRADE 
While Canada has, more or less since 1813, regarded its frontier with the United 
States as a matter of trade and commerce in the first instance, the United States today 
considers its northern border in terms of a problem for national security. Public opinion 
polls reveal that Americans believe that another terrorist attack is probable, which keeps 
“security issues in the front ranks of administration and congressional activity,” and 
therefore, the emphasis of U.S. policy and practice on the U.S. border.
157
 But will this 
fixation on security last? Although security continues to resonate with Americans, it 
appears that the winds of change are blowing. There is a renewed national commitment to 
improve U.S. economic standings at home and abroad. Therefore, the United States has 
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begun to reassess its trade relations with its northern neighbors―and, thus, to redraw 
some of its policies and positions on the U.S.-Canadian border. This shift in priorities 
may leave a void in northern border security that someone will need to fill, and the U.S. 
northern border states are prime candidates. 
1. U.S. Border Security Need 
The United States has undergone a security transformation over the last decade. 
The 9/11 Commission Report and three Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reports all 
identified border security as a weakness. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has 
reported that the northern border still suffered a lack of oversight and coordination, and a 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearing echoed GAO findings. As of 
September 11, 2012, eleven years after the horrific terrorist attacks at the World Trade 
Center, the U.S. federal government was still able to identify many of the same security 
vulnerabilities highlighted in all the earlier reports and studies. Separately and as a group, 
these reports set out the continuing national security requirements that relate to the 
northern border―and the continuing struggle to meet them.  
2. American Self-Assessment 
The 9/11 Commission Report was the U.S. government’s attempt to take a critical 
view of its own security inadequacies. Border security was one of those inadequacies. In 
fact, the report revealed that before the 9/11 terrorist attacks the U.S. Congress did not 
consider the northern border a security threat: 
Congress, with the support of the Clinton administration, doubled the 
number of Border Patrol agents required along the border with Mexico to 
one agent every quarter mile by 1999. It rejected efforts to bring additional 
resources to bear in the north. The border with Canada had one agent for 
every 13.25 miles. Despite examples of terrorists entering form Canada, 
awareness of terrorist activity in Canada and its more lenient immigration 
laws, and an inspector general’s report recommending that the Border 
Patrol develop a northern border strategy, the only positive step was that 
the number of Border Patrol agents was not cut any further.
158
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During the 1990s, the United States was focused on the southern border. The 
beginning of that decade was a time for dramatic changes in immigration policies over 
the U.S.-Mexico border. Therefore, President Clinton decided that “[r]ather than 
apprehending people once they had entered the U.S., Border Patrol [would] stop them 
from entering at all.”159 Since migration was primarily a southern border problem, his 
policy of deterrence was directed there. The northern border was not viewed in the same 
manner, so the border security resources naturally flowed south. This narrow view of 
border security overlooked the potential threat from terrorism that existed in Canada. In 
fact, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service and U.S. intelligence agencies (FBI 
and CIA) were tracking people like the Jabara brothers, suspected al-Queda operatives, 
and Muhammed Harkat who was “believed to have helped Islamic militants from 
Afghanistan, Chechnya and Pakistan enter Canada illegally.”160 These potential threats 
were all living or operating in Canada during the 1990s. Even though the American and 
Canadian authorities recognized the threat, they were not committed to dealing with it at 
that time. Instead, the American’s primary concern was southern immigration. To solve 
this security mismatch, the 9/11 Commission Report recommended increasing the number 
of northern border agents and “undertaking a Joint Perimeter Defense program with 
Canada.”161 
3. Washington’s Post-9/11 Shifting Border Security Approaches 
Since 2001, the United States has struggled to clarify its role in the border 
security arena. In fact, the last three Quadrennial Defense Review reports, written within 
ten years of each other, all prioritize border security differently as a national security 
threat. As the national interest regarding border vulnerabilities quickly grew in the wake 
of the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States acknowledged its importance in the 2001 
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QDR. Released just weeks after the attacks, the QDR pointed out that “economic 
globalization and the attendant increase in travel and trade across U.S. borders has 
created new vulnerabilities for hostile states and actors to exploit by perpetrating attacks 
on the U.S. homeland.”162 Unfortunately, the QDR implies that the vulnerabilities were 
something new and problematic. In response, the Department of Defense “announced the 
establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to consolidate under a 
single unified command those existing homeland defense and civil support missions that 
were previously executed by other military organizations” in 2002.163 Canada was 
essentially dragged along for the ride due to its partnership in NORAD, because NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM are both under the purview of U.S. command. Ultimately, the 
Department of Defense, in light of the 2001 QDR, recognized the importance of border 
security, made it a new priority, and coopted Canada to be a part of it. 
Just one year after the establishment of U.S. Northern Command, the United 
States went to war with Iraq. The war in Afghanistan started shortly thereafter. Around 
the same time, the Department of Homeland Security came into being, which assumed 
the majority of responsibility for border security for the United States. These events 
changed the priorities listed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report. In fact, the 
2006 QDR only skimmed over border security issues, because the United States’ primary 
focus was on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the Department of Defense 
adopted an offensive and overseas approach to homeland security, while DHS handled 
most of the security at home. This drastic shift in U.S. security focus forced Canada to 
reevaluate its foreign security interests as well. The Canadians now needed to work with 
the new Department of Homeland Security for the majority of border security concerns 
and the DoD for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Over the next several years, public support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
significantly eroded. At that same time, some of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
weaknesses were revealed. For instance, the Transportation Security Administration had 
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airline security lapses like Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, and Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber. In addition, according to a 2011 GAO report, the 
Customs and Border Protection still had “significant weaknesses” in their inspection 
processes at a number of points of entry.
164
 These security weaknesses caused many 
Americans to question the Department of Homeland Security’s capability to effectively 
safeguard the American people.  
Almost a decade after the terror attacks of 9/11, as the war in Iraq was drawing to 
a close and as the public confidence in the Department of Homeland Security was 
declining, the 2010 QDR sought to reprioritize the U.S. security concerns. It stated, “The 
Department will … enhance defense relationships and continue to work with Canada in 
the context of regional security.”165 Now the American policy makers’ focus had shifted 
to an emphasis on regional security, which was revealed in the 2011 U.S.-Canada Beyond 
the Border action plan that entailed a perimeter security approach. Yet again, the 
Canadians shifted their border security policy stance in order to stay in line with 
Washington elites. However, in this case, Canada was more than happy to oblige, 
because this action plan promoted economic competitiveness through easing trade 
restrictions, which was Canada’s primary policy concern all along. 
American border security policy approaches have ebbed and flowed over the last 
decade. The decade began with Washington’s post-9/11 hardliner border security 
policies. Then U.S. policy makers shifted to addressing their security threats overseas. 
Washington’s most recent approach from 2011 focused on regional security. Each time, 
American policy makers expected the support and cooperation from the Canadians. The 
inconsistency of U.S. security policies during this period must have been challenging for 
the Canadian policy makers to contend with, not to mention baffling. 
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4. American Border Security Weaknesses Continue 
On September 11, 2012, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security held 
a hearing to evaluate the progress and problems of the U.S. border security enterprise. 
The mere fact that there is a Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security suggests the 
importance of these issues to the American people, and it implies that the need for better 
border security still exists. Unfortunately, even today border security impediments are 
prevalent. One of the witnesses at the hearing, Charles K. Edwards who was the Acting 
Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security, candidly discussed several 
institutional obstacles that remain problematic, particularly with respects to information 
sharing between different law enforcement agencies at the borders. Edwards pointed out 
that “DHS officers at any of the 327 air, sea, or land border ports of entry have to access 
as many as 17 different DHS systems to verify the identity and evaluate the admissibility 
of foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States.”166 This process “hinders border 
security officers in their efforts to verify or eliminate links to … terrorism.”167 
Essentially, information sharing issues make controlling border access into the United 
States more difficult for U.S. border agents and easier for hostile actors like terrorists to 
circumvent the system.  
Additional hindrances to U.S. border security operations are unmet critical 
infrastructure needs and resource allocation challenges, which exacerbates the 
information sharing problems for the various border security entities. For example: 
“Some CBP Officers … use only mobile devices that lack the bandwidth and access to 
multiple databases that desktop terminals provide” while operating in the field.168 This 
insufficient on-scene connectivity is problematic for the U.S. agents at the various points 
of entry, because it interferes with their ability to “check travel documents to identify 
potential fraudulent or stolen passports, visas, or other travel documents before admitting 
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an individual to enter the United States.”169 Compounding the issues of critical 
infrastructure is poor resource allocation. A 2012 DHS OIG report (OIG-12-39) 
recommended that redundant databases like the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System should be “terminated” to save money.170 If the Department of Homeland 
Security were to eliminate some of their duplicate screening programs, lacking border 
security infrastructure problems could be reduced. 
The biggest hindrance to the Department of Homeland Security’s operations is 
mission overlap. The Office of Inspector General for DHS pointed out that “missions that 
overlap between ICE HSI [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland 
Security Investigations] and the U.S. Border Patrol on the northern and southern border 
have been a source of concern since the establishment of DHS.”171 Reducing any sort of 
redundancy would bring costs to the Department of Homeland Security, which would 
help alleviate financial constraints for other key challenges like inadequate infrastructure.  
The takeaway from the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearings 
was that Washington still has its critical eye on border security. It also freely admits that 
there are numerous institutional problems that require significant work to improve 
security practices at the borders. Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security is on 
the hook to make those improvements happen.  
5. Is Northern Border Security Worth the Cost? 
With all the problems and changes required by the Department of Homeland 
Security, is all the effort worth the costs to improve security along the northern border? 
Maybe it is, but apprehensions are down along the U.S.-Canada border. However, 
staffing and budgets have steadily increased over the same period for U.S. agencies that 
operate there, but some of their budgets have dipped recently.  
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Table 1 provides illegal immigrant apprehension statistics from 1970 to 2010, and 
it includes CBP and ICE data for the entire country. Table 1 reveals that illegal immigrant 
apprehensions are on a serious decline since 2000. It also reveals that “apprehensions 
were at their lowest level since 1972.”172 These are only national level statistics, so do 
they resemble the northern border statistics? In fact, they do. Table 2 reveals a fairly 
steady decline of apprehensions along the northern border since 1999. 
 
Table 1. Aliens Apprehended: Fiscal Years 1970 to 2011173 
Table 2 also reveals that apprehension levels were nearly double what they are 
today on one quarter of the budget. It could be argued that the extra funding allocated to 
border security during the last several years has contributed to the reduction in 
apprehensions, because there are simply less people attempting to illegally cross the 
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border with the added border security staff. On the other hand, Table 2 may also reveal a 
waste of limited resources, namely funding, because it does not appear that there is any 
more bang for the buck. Either way, this chart appears to indicate that the United States 
has reached a point of diminishing returns for its ability to reduce apprehensions while 
increasing funding and staffing levels. 
 
Table 2. U.S. Border Patrol Apprehension, Budget, and Staffing  
Statistics: 1999 to 2011174 
If the federal government is at a point of diminishing returns, then logic dictates 
that funding decreases will be on the horizon for agencies involved with northern border 
security. Points of fact, two of the three main agencies―the U.S. Coast Guard and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement―responsible for U.S. border security have seen 
reductions recently. Of the three, only the CBP has a marginal budget increase for 2013. 
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In fact, in a February 2012 message from the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral 
Bob Papp candidly instructed his shipmates that “the FY 2013 request would decrease 
[the] budget by 338 million dollars or about 3.9 percent. This is a change from the past 
decade of growth, but reflects the reality of the marked shift in the fiscal climate.”175 
Additionally, the FY2013 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency “requested 
$5,332 million in net budget authority, which represents a decrease of $218 million 
(3.9%) from the enacted FY2012 level of $5,551 million.”176 Interestingly, these 
reductions are only a drop in the bucket compared to the FY2013 discretionary budget of 
$39.510 billion requested by DHS.
177
 
While there is evidence that the agencies involved in northern border security 
have produced results, albeit limited and at ever increasing costs, border security issues 
remain. Therefore, Washington continues to foot the bill, but perfect security is far too 
expensive. In fact, the United States may have reached a point of diminishing returns 
regarding northern border security, which is why some border security funding has begun 
to get scaled back. Regardless, Americans still seem compelled to provide border security 
protection along the U.S.-Canada border, and a variety of security strategies support that 
commitment. 
B. THE U.S. BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGIES 
The United States clearly perceives a threat due to border security vulnerabilities, 
but do Americans consider the security weaknesses important enough to expend valuable 
and limited resources on it? If the number of U.S. strategies that address border security 
is any indication, then they do. On the other hand, those same strategies may only be lip 
service that masks waning support for greater northern border security measures. 
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1. National Security Strategy (2010) 
Zooming out to view U.S. national security policies in their broadest sense, the 
2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) establishes President Obama’s priorities. As a 
result of globalization, security challenges like international terrorism and the economy 
top the list. Due to these challenges the president plans to use “strong and durable 
approaches to defend our homeland,” but what does that mean?178 Essentially, the 
president needs the federal government to balance physical security with economics. 
More specifically to the present question, he expects a balance between border security 
and trade. But are they equally important or does one take priority?  
When it comes to the nation’s borders in the 21st century, security is the priority, 
but trade’s importance is gaining momentum. Interestingly, the National Security 
Strategy states, “Canada is our closest trading partner, a steadfast security ally, and an 
important partner in regional and global efforts.”179 Maybe the order of these priorities 
does not indicate precedence; however, an argument could certainly be made that the 
primacy of trade in growing in the regional partnership. In fact, aside from a few isolated 
incidents, trade has almost always taken precedence along the northern border. 
The U.S.-Canada trade relationship is very important to Washington. As proof, 
during President Obama’s State of the Union address in 2010, he introduced the National 
Export Initiative and promised: “We will double our exports over the next five years.”180 
If the United States is going to double its exports, Canada will be the predominant U.S. 
partner in that equation. For the president to make this assertion, he must accept lowering 
barriers to trade, specifically those along the northern border. It appears that after a 
decade steeped in physical security measures, Americans, even at the highest levels of 
government, are finally willing to strategically forego some border security measures in 
order to enhance U.S. global economic standings.  
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2. DHS Strategic Plan and Northern Border Strategy (2012) 
In February 2012, the Department of Homeland Security developed a strategic 
plan that accords with the policies laid out in the 2010 National Security Strategy. In it, 
Janet Napolitano stated that her agency “provides essential support to national and 
economic security.”181 Specifically, she means the United States Customs and Border 
Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and the Coast Guard. Each agency is 
tasked with different aspects of DHS’s security mission along the border.  
Interestingly, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security considers 
one of the department’s primary functions to be the mitigation of challenges that stem 
from the trade-versus-security tug-of-war. In fact, one of the five key missions within the 
strategic plan states, “The protection of the Nation’s borders―land, air, and sea―from 
the illegal entry of people, weapons, drugs and other contraband while facilitating lawful 
travel and trade is vital to homeland security, as well as the Nation’s economic 
prosperity.”182  
In light of this mission, DHS claims that it “made critical security improvements 
along the Northern and maritime borders while facilitating the lawful transit of people 
and goods across [the] borders.”183 One of those improvements was apparently writing a 
Northern Border Strategy (NBS), the first of its kind. The 2012 NBS is an extension of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Strategic Plan. The Northern Border Strategy 
highlights the complexity of the threat environment along the shared border, and it takes 
an all-missions approach to secure it “while expediting the flow of lawful travel, trade, 
and immigration.”184 Ultimately, the NBS is an attempt to fine-tune Washington’s 
broader security policies as they apply to the northern border. 
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The Northern Border Strategy also reinforces cooperative efforts with Canadians, 
which bespeaks the tenets set forth in the Beyond the Border declaration signed by 
President Obama and Prime Minister Harper in 2011. In fact, enduring partnerships and 
collaborative efforts that recognize and bolster economic interconnectedness appear to be 
one of the primary focuses of this DHS strategy. Without question, this border security 
strategy is still about protecting Americans from physical harm, but the importance of 
economic security and prosperity is growing. Therefore, the Northern Border Strategy, 
like the National Security Strategy, may indicate a fundamental shift in U.S. policy away 
from a security first mentality on the northern border to one that leans toward efficient 
trade. 
3. Great Lakes Maritime Strategy (2011) 
Not all U.S. strategies seem to be playing off the same sheet of music. The 2011 
Great Lakes Maritime Strategy: A Strategic Framework for the Coast Guard on the 
Great Lakes focuses on physical security more than anything else. It repeatedly mentions 
cooperation, partnerships, and collaboration, but it lacks the National Security Strategy’s 
conviction for trade. Although the economic criticality of the Great Lakes is mentioned, 
the strategy simply fails to emphasize the significance of efficient trade along the 
northern border. The strategy does state, “[T]he entirety of our effort must be 
‘watermarked’ with Canada,” but it is referring to physical security, not trade.185 Maybe 
this is a step back from the importance of trade over security, but it is likely only an 
oversight―especially since the U.S. Coast Guard falls squarely under the purview of the 
Department of Homeland Security, which considers trade with Canada a priority. 
4. Why So Many Strategies? 
Why does the United States feel as though it is necessary to have so many 
strategies that stress the importance of border security? It is likely a learned behavior 
from years of witnessing Canada’s NATO burden-shifting policies play out. To counter-
balance Canada’s burden-shifting policies, the United States uses unilateral policy 
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decisions for its security. American unilateralism has often complicated trade issues 
along the U.S.-Canada border, because the American security-first mentality forces 
burden-shifting states like Canada to comply with U.S. security standards. The result is 
trade restrictions at their shared border.  
C. AMERICAN UNILATERALISM 
Partly as a result of the generation gap, the American mood oscillates 
dangerously between being ashamed of power and expecting too much of 
it. The former attitude deprecates the use of possession of force; the latter 
is overly receptive to the possibilities of absolute action and overly 
indifferent to the likely consequences.  
—Henry Kissinger (1969)186 
The United States has a history of implementing unilateral foreign policies, 
particularly those in the border security realm, which have resulted in intentional 
unbalanced burden-sharing by the United States. Unilateralism, in the context of this 
thesis, means “policies formed without regard for other states that might be affected, 
especially policies that defy others’ wishes or policies that reject what others see as 
duties.”187 Although American unilateralist policies existed prior to 2001, George W. 
Bush amplified them during his Presidency. Interestingly, President Obama stills carries 
the torch of unilateralism, but seems more willing to explore other policy options with 
Canada. Chances are, Americans will continue to expect a primarily unilateral policy 
stance toward border security in the future, and if terrorism rears its ugly head on U.S. 
soil again, bilateral policies will not be welcomed.  
1.  U.S. Unilateralism Prior to 2001 
Americans have been contemplating unilateral policies since the founding of the 
United States. In fact, its predisposition for unilateralism began with George Washington 
who “warned his countrymen to avoid ‘entangling alliances,” and unilateralist policies 
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can be witnessed in the latest wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.
188
 American 
unilateralism was certainly a concern after the Cold War, because “no one could predict 
how far the U.S. unilateral instinct might go.”189 Some have even argued that U.S. 
unilateralism was partially responsible for World War II. Clearly, there is evidence that 
the United States practices unilateralism, but why? According to Thomas Kane, 
“Americans, it seems, are eager to co-operate with the rest of the world, but only as long 
as they get their own way. America’s leaders are equally headstrong, and the result is 
unilateralism.”190 There have been times where Americans have adhered to multilateral 
policies like the formation of the League of Nations, NATO, NAFTA, and the United 
Nations, but in times when American security seems threatened, like after the devastating 
attacks on September 11, it falls back on its unilateralist roots.
191
  
2. U.S. Unilateralism During George W. Bush’s Presidency 
After the World Trade Center was attacked, Americans rallied around the flag, 
tried to understand their new reality, and expected protection from their government. 
Washington answered by clamping down on security, particularly at the border. The 
southern border was well protected at that time, but the northern border was wide open. 
President George W. Bush changed all that. Under the auspices of a new Department of 
Homeland Security, he ensured that thousands of additional border security agents were 
sent to the U.S.-Canada border. He also instituted numerous border security measures 
that the Canadians were forced to accept. Although the Canadians were supportive of 
increased security measures along the border, they begrudgingly accepted the United 
States’ unilateral implementation style. Daniel Drache captured the Canadian sentiment 
of the time when he wrote: 
Homeland security is based on American self-interest and unilateral 
exercise of power. The US does not ask if its allies or even its closest 
neighbor approves of boarding the ‘security’ train. They are expected to be 
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on it. From the American perspective, the US will rely on its own military 
and legislative framework to secure its interest both globally and 
continentally. It will cooperate with other countries when it suits 
American interests to do so, but just as frequently it will act unilaterally. 
Bush put it starkly, ‘When it comes to our security, we don’t need 
anybody’s permission.’ The homeland security doctrine is the embodiment 
of undivided sovereignty―the US sets down the rules for others.192 
Regardless of the Canadians’ apprehension to bow to U.S. unilateral border security 
actions, they did it, because the Canadians understood how committed the Americans 
were to their new security paradigm. Frank Harvey wrote, “The most straightforward 
measure of this commitment can be seen in the number, scope and overall cost of 
unilateral initiatives” ushered in by President Bush.193 
3. U.S. Unilateralism During Barack Obama’s Presidency 
Initially, Canadians understood America’s preoccupation with its security after 
the terror attacks in New York, but by 2008 they had grown weary of American unilateral 
border security actions. In fact, the Canadians considered U.S. actions to be a 
“counterproductive thickening of border procedures, causing hassle and costly delays at 
the border and undermining much of the efficiency, hence the competitiveness, of [the] 
highly integrated economies.”194 Therefore, as Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, a 
unilateralist cloud overshadowed much of Washington’s border security policies. As a 
result, the world’s leaders waited to see if President Obama would continue these 
policies, or take a more multilateral approach to foreign policy as was hinted at in his 
inaugural address. President Obama said, “[O]ur power alone cannot protect us, nor does 
it entitle us to do as we please.”195 But, did President Obama make good on this 
sentiment? Point of fact, he did, because in 2011 he managed to sign the Beyond the 
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Border declaration with Prime Minister Stephen Harper, which focused on a perimeter 
approach to border security.  
Some Canadians considered the Beyond the Border declaration “refreshingly 
bilateral in scope,” but have Americans viewed it the same way?196 Not hardly, because 
Americans view their security egocentrically. Regardless of the bilateral declaration, 
Canada essentially received American consent to reduce border thickening. Without that 
consent, border security would remain the primary focus of American border policies. 
Essentially, that is implied U.S. unilateralism. In addition, if another terrorist attack 
similar to 9/11 happened, then Americans would feel threatened and initiate unilateral 
security actions again. Therefore, this is an example of intentional unbalanced burden-
sharing by the United States. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Washington remains captivated, if not captive, with its views on security. 
Concurrently, the United States considers the northern border a security problem, at least 
at the moment. The American primacy of security is totally out of step with Canada’s 
trade interests at the U.S.-Canada border. Unfortunately, American unilateralism only 
exacerbates the problem. There is some acknowledgement by U.S. policy makers, 
revealed in recent strategies, that trade is becoming more important to Americans again. 
The American public and Washington elites, alike, have rediscovered that the U.S. policy 
making decisions of the last decade have had significant trade ramifications. Budget 
reductions for key agencies responsible for border security suggest that policy makers 
may finally be willing to get off the security-first bandwagon. This change could 
eventually lead Americans to view trade as their primary concern. In the meantime, 
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V. U.S. BORDER STATES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
The ongoing challenge … is to come up with security solutions and 
procedures that do not make this region vulnerable and dysfunctional on 
the economic side. 
—Asst. Deputy Minister Phil Ventura (2002)197 
 
Figure 1.  Great Lakes Region198 
Washington’s security priorities and Canadian trade interests intersect―and 
sometimes collide―in the Great Lakes region. U.S. states including Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York must negotiate conflicting 
interests and requirements. On the one hand, because the United States is Canada’s 
largest trading partner, and the majority of this trade goes through the Great Lakes region, 
trade is vital for these states, many of which suffered especially in the economic 
downturn of the recent decade. 
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On the other hand, these states bear a particular burden in the national border 
security, thanks to their geographical position. New York and Pennsylvania had to 
contend first-hand with the violence and destruction of September 11, so there is no 
question among the northern tier that some security presence is necessary. From the 
states’ view, moreover, there also is a clear economic incentive to participate in a 
muscular defense of the U.S. northern border. The federal government continues to pour 
billions of dollars into U.S. homeland security infrastructure, which provides these states 
with a lot of revenue and jobs to support the infrastructure.  
Legitimate concerns and responses pull the states in several directions on the 
question of border security. How should the states approach such a serious conundrum? 
Should they focus their efforts on the homeland security mission of the United States, or 
the vital trade routes with their northern neighbors? More to the point, do the states in the 
Great Lakes region even consider the northern border a security threat, or is its current 
condition nothing more than an impediment to trade? 
A. SECURITY VERSUS TRADE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
The Great Lakes region has some unique U.S.-Canada border concerns. Some of 
its vulnerabilities pose a significant threat to effective trade with Canada. Specifically, 
shipping disruptions on, over, and under the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway 
system could cripple the region, which is home to millions of people. To deal with these 
problems, the states in the Great Lakes region have implemented a series of strategies and 
created a robust homeland security industry to enforce them. Essentially, this diverse 
community of states has fostered an environment, whereby, they can appease, participate 
in, and benefit from the U.S. homeland security enterprise and keep the trade moving 
over the U.S.-Canadian border in an effort for economic prosperity for their citizens. 
By and large, most local communities within the Great Lakes region feel 
relatively secure from threats originating across the U.S.-Canada border. Even so, a lot of 
local governments and businesses are highly integrated into each of the state’s security 
and trade implementation processes. In some ways, they act altruistically to protect the 
citizens, but they also work hard to cash in on the homeland security dollars allocated to 
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the states. While homeland security funding is certainly valuable for some, trade with 
Canada is the backbone for many local economies. Trade with Canada supplies many 
citizens with jobs and money in their pockets. Ultimately, the vast majority of private 
citizens residing in the Great Lakes region consider trade with Canada their priority, but 
security fears linger, which keeps the homeland security enterprise humming and ever-
present. 
1. Do Great Lakes Regional States Generally Feel Insecure? 
The various states that make up the Great Lakes region do not all assess their 
security threats from Canada equally. Some states consider border security more of a 
priority than others. Some hardly consider it a priority at all, because the terrorist attack 
on September 11, 2001, happened more than a decade ago, with few terrorist events 
occurring in the meantime. Ten years is a long time for Americans to remain focused on 
border security policies. As one might expect, most of the states in the region have begun 
to put their security concerns on the back burner while refocusing their efforts on trade 
with Canada, which is, for the most part, more pressing on a day-to-day level. Even the 
state of New York, which is still reeling from the 9/11 tragedy, has proven willing to 
forgo a certain level of security for the criticality of trade with Canada, because it has 
such a large impact on the economic stability for the people, businesses, and governments 
of the state. 
a. Minnesota and Wisconsin: Minimally Concerned 
States like Minnesota and Wisconsin have minimal security concerns. 
Minnesota’s land border is extremely remote in places, which makes access problematic. 
That did not stop Minnesota from using some homeland security dollars to bolster 
security on its piece of the border. In 2012, CBP opened a border station in the National 
Forest Complex in Ely, Minnesota, that “serves individuals arriving from Canada via the 
Boundary Water Canoe Area.”199 Minnesota and Wisconsin’s more pressing security 
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interests lie with the ports on Lake Superior where iron ore, grain, and other products are 
unloaded and loaded for transport through the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway 
system. These two states are primarily focused on protecting trade industries at its ports 
from attack and getting their piece of the homeland security pie. For instance, Minnesota 
uses a Port and Waterway Security Working Group to “keep these vital commercial 
gateways operating safely and securely,” and Douglas County, Wisconsin, “received 
$176,354 from Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 2011 Port Security 
Grant Program.”200 Clearly, Minnesota and Wisconsin are primarily concerned with 
efficient trade, not from direct threats originating in Canada. 
b. Ohio and Pennsylvania: Slightly Concerned 
Ohio and Pennsylvania also have limited border security concerns, aside 
from federal funding that goes into programs that operate in each state. For example: 
Ohio is the home of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Ninth District Command Center, which 
polices the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system under the auspices of a joint 
U.S.-Canada international memorandum with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In 
2012, Ohio also opened a new $25 million U.S. CBP station in Port Clinton that 
“employs 95 personnel.”201 Similarly, Pennsylvania has a border-security industry in the 
state, notably with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection operations in Erie, Tom 
Ridge’s home town. While some consider the operations a waste of taxpayer dollars, 
others suggest they are beneficial to the local communities. In fact, since the CBP started 
operating in Erie nearly nine years ago, it “has fueled a rise in Erie-area apprehensions, 
which in turn has fueled the need for more agency resources.”202 The Erie Times-News 
reported that the apprehensions rose “from 332 in fiscal 2006-2007 to 588 in 2008-
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2009.”203 But more importantly, in 2010, a shiny new CBP facility opened that “will cost 
the government $818,991 a year―or $68,249 a month―to rent over the next 20 
years.”204 Even though the apprehension numbers are relatively low compared to other 
places, they represent federal money being spent that supports Erie’s local economy. 
Other than the financial benefits of operating these institutions, Ohio and Pennsylvania 
have little interest in Washington’s security-first mindset. Their real interests lie in trade 
with Canada.  
While Ohio and Pennsylvania’s financial gains from the homeland 
security enterprise are substantial, they pale in comparison to the trade benefits with 
Canada. According to the Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C., some “301,100 jobs 
in the Buckeye State depend[ed] on the Canada-Ohio trade relationship, which [was] 
valued at $24.7 billion [and] … 138 Canadian-owned companies employ[ed] 16,487 
people in 757 locations in Ohio” in 2010.205 Similarly, approximately “330,600 jobs in 
the Keystone State depend[ed] on the Canada-Pennsylvania trade relationship, which 
[was] valued at $16.8 billion [and] … 139 Canadian-owned companies employ[ed] 
24,626 people in 579 locations in Pennsylvania” the same year.206 Obviously, a strong 
working relationship with Canada is vital to Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
c. Michigan and New York: Moderately Concerned 
Michigan is moderately concerned with security. In 2009, Michigan 
experienced a terror plot in the skies over Detroit on Christmas day. Umar Farouk 
Abdulmatallab attempted to detonate his underwear, and he hoped that Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253 would blow up, too. His terror plot was not successful, but it 
reminded Michiganders of their susceptibility to terror attacks. Today, Michigan conducts 
training and exercises to prepare for homeland security threats. According to Michigan’s 
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Deputy State Director of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Captain W. 
Thomas Sands, “The State of Michigan has built an extensive homeland security 
structure to safeguard Michigan’s residents and resources by ensuring the necessary 
plans, procedures, systems, and protocols are established before an emergency occurs.”207 
Michigan also has the country’s largest Arab population, and the second 
largest outside of the Middle East. This Arab population has not been a breeding ground 
for terrorism, nor should one expect it to be in the future, but it places Michigan firmly in 
the cross-hairs for scrutiny. To ease concerns about the Arab community, the Michigan 
Muslim Community Council works closely with “a coalition of federal 
agencies―Homeland Security, Justice Department, INS, FBI, TSA as well as Border 
Patrol and local law-enforcement―in order to protect … civil rights, while contributing 
to [the] country’s security.”208 
Homeland security is big business in Michigan. A security industry has 
sprung up to meet current national security demands. For example: the Michigan 
Homeland Security Consortium “is a non-profit organization serving the homeland 
security industry in Michigan. The consortium is a public/private partnership, whose goal 
is to bring development and awareness to homeland security, homeland defense, and 
critical infrastructure protection.”209 This consortium, like others, wants Michigan to be a 
leader in the security industry, and they hope that it will be “at the forefront to the state’s 
economic revitalization.”210 
It goes without saying that New York considers its security an even larger 
priority, especially in the post-9/11 world. In fact, New York City (NYC) alone has more 
police than the U.S. Coast Guard has personnel. The New York City police department 
also has an extensive intelligence arm, and it uses tactical teams akin to military Special 
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Forces. However, New York State residents that live outside of NYC do not feel nearly 
as threated as those who reside within the city limits. 
Michigan and New York also value efficient trade with Canada. 
According to Rick Snyder, Michigan’s Governor, “With our NITC [New International 
Trade Crossing] agreement in place, the opportunities to expand the benefits of our 
Michigan-Canada partnership are even greater. This mission has allowed us to explore 
ways we can further strengthen this highly productive relationship.”211 As for New York, 
it has staggering statistics in its trading partnership with Canada. In 2010, “517,000 jobs 
in the Empire State depend[ed] on the Canada−New York trade relationship, which was 
valued at $29 billion [and] … 449 Canadian-owned companies employ[ed] 34,901 people 
in 1,148 locations in New York.”212 Michigan has similar trade statistics with Canada. 
Ultimately, New York and Michigan have varying degrees of security concerns, but they 
both want to maintain strong trade relations with Canada. Therefore, they must carefully 
straddle the line of security and trade in order to appease their citizens and the Canadians 
just north of their border.  
2. Great Lakes Regional Vulnerabilities 
The Great Lakes region has a number of significant border security 
vulnerabilities. Some of the most susceptible to security threats are the choke points 
along the waterways used for shipping, high-traffic shipping ports, and various tunnels 
and bridges that span the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system. 
a. Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway Constraints 
The St. Lawrence Seaway is a 50-year-old bi-national transportation asset 
serving substantial manufacturing and service industries in both the United States and 
Canada. The purpose of the Seaway is to allow the shipment of raw materials and 
finished products throughout the Great Lakes and around the world. The St. Lawrence 
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Seaway system starts in Montreal, Canada and extends all the way through to Lake 
Superior. It is a series of lakes, canals, and locks that connect the Great Lakes with the 
Atlantic Ocean.  The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system consists of a number 
of large bodies of water, which include Lake Michigan, Erie, Superior, Huron, Ontario, 
George, and St. Clair. Sprinkled throughout the lakes is a series of shipping ports on both 
sides of the border. 
 
Figure 2.  Great Lakes System Profile213 
Connecting the different bodies of water are the St. Marys River, St. Clair 
River, Detroit River, Welland Canal and the St. Lawrence River, which dumps into the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence and finally, to the North Atlantic Ocean. Along some of the rivers 
are lock systems that enable ships to change elevation to continue their trek along the 
seaway. There are 15 distinct locks within this system, which include six in the St. 
Lawrence River, eight in the Welland Canal, and one on the St. Marys River. Collocated 
with the locks there are roads, bridges and hydro-electric power stations. Ultimately, the 
lock systems, the St. Clair/Detroit River system, and high-traffic shipping ports are the 
primary constraints along the shared border of the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
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b. Soo Locks 
Out of all the locks within the system, the capacity of the Soo Locks is the 
most significant constraint. The Soo Locks, also known as the Sault Locks, connect Lake 
Superior to Lake Huron by creating a bypass along the rapids in St. Marys River, and 
they are located between the cities of Sault Sainte Marie, Ontario and Sault Sainte Marie, 
Michigan. The Soo Locks consist of four individual locks operating in parallel. The Poe 
Lock is 1,200 feet long, 110 feet wide, 32 feet deep, and is the only lock in the system 
that is capable of handling the largest lake freighters used on the Great Lakes. The 
MacArthur, Davis, and Sabin Locks cannot handle these large freighters. If the Poe were 
disabled, Midwestern industries such as steelmaking and electric power generation would 
be crippled. 
 
Figure 3.  Soo Locks214 
The Lake Carriers Association described the Poe Lock as the “single point 
of failure that can cripple Great Lakes shipping.”215 Approximately 10,000 ships use the 
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Poe and MacArthur Locks annually between April and December carrying roughly 
25,000 tons of cargo each. In fact, during the 2008 season “a stunning 80.6 million tons 
of cargo passed through this engineering marvel.”216 Vessels containing taconite pellets 
used in iron production, wheat, and coal, primarily ship through the Soo Locks. Every 
day fifteen ships pass through the locks, seven of which are carrying iron ore. 
Interestingly, the iron ore trade alone accounts for approximately $160 million dollars per 
month, or roughly $5 million per day.
217
 Therefore, the Poe Lock is the Achilles heel of 
the Great Lakes Navigation System. 
c. St. Clair/Detroit River System 
Other constraints along the St. Lawrence Seaway are the choke points and 
capacity of the St. Clair/Detroit River system between Lake Huron and Lake Erie. There 
are tunnels, bridges, islands, ice, logs, mud, boulders, and recreational boaters that must 
be avoided in this portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The channels are also difficult, 
because they are narrow, shallow, and require constant maintenance and dredging. 
 
Figure 4.  St. Clair/Detroit River System218 
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Each of the three sections of the St. Clair/Detroit River system has specific 
challenges. The St. Clair River travels south from Lake Huron, and “is divided into a 28 
mile upper section and an 11 mile lower delta section, commonly called the St. Chair 
Flats. A navigation channel runs through the length of the river and along the South 
Channel in the delta.”219 Lake St. Clair is the next section, which connects the St. Clair 
River to the Detroit River. Its average depth is only 11 feet, so a channel was “dredged to 
a depth of 27.5 feet and a width of 800 feet that stretches 18.5 miles.”220 There are no 
natural harbors in Lake St. Clair for the freighters to use for mooring. The last section is 
the Detroit River. It is approximately 32 miles between Lake St. Clair and the deep 
waters of Lake Erie. This river is generally deep, but there are some portions that require 
frequent dredging. Unfortunately, the bottom is very rocky, which makes dredging 
difficult. Some “navigation channels greater than 27 feet and varying in width from 600 
to 1200 feet are maintained through the Detroit River.”221 
d. High-Traffic Shipping Ports 
The St. Lawrence Seaway system is constrained by the number of ports on 
the Great Lakes. Only limited number of these ports can handle the large volumes of 
cargo from the giant Great Lakes freighters. According to Great Lakes Seaway Review: 
The International Transportation Magazine of Midcontinent North America, “More than 
300 million metric tons of cargo move along the waterway annually, including domestic 
and U.S.-Canadian trade within the Lakes and international import-export trade via the 
Seaway. This traffic fuels an economic engine that annually generates more than $4.3 
billion in personal income, $3.4 billion in transportation-related revenue and $1.3 billion 
in federal, state and local taxes.”222 The magazine goes on to claim that “[o]n the U.S. 
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side alone, more than 152,000 jobs are related to cargo movement on the system.”223 If 
port access is restricted, the system is unable to deliver commodities efficiently to their 
destinations, which creates backlogs that could cost the region millions of dollars per day. 
e. Points of Entry: Tunnels and Bridges 
The bridges and tunnels that cross the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Seaway present vulnerabilities to the system for the transportation industry and the border 
protection for the people of the Great Lakes region. Congestion from security measures, 
as well as operation and maintenance oversight, compound the complexity of these vital 
arteries of transportation. According to a 2007 joint U.S.-Canada study, “The 
maintenance of many of these crossing structures falls under the jurisdiction of the same 
organizations responsible for operation and maintenance of the locks. In the case of the 
Welland Canal, these bridges are all owned by Transport Canada and operated by the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation,” a Canadian company.224 Obviously, it is 
much more difficult for the United States to ensure security on border crossings that are 
not managed by American companies. Partnerships with these Canadian companies 
become critical to safeguard American citizens and the trade that crosses the border. 
Essentially, at a number of the crossing structures along the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Seaway, Americans must rely on Canadians for their protection. 
Security measures by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency can 
slow trade to a trickle. This issue can affect trade along the entirety of the northern 
border, but it is especially problematic in the Great Lakes region, because of the finite 
number of crossing points for the Seaway. A 2010 GAO report (GAO-10-694) suggests: 
CBP has taken steps to address some of the infrastructure needs of its 
aging northern border POEs [Point of Entry] and recognizes the continued 
need for improvements to speed the flow of traffic. These improvements 
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are particularly important in light of projections regarding the increase in 
trade between Canada and the United States.
225
 
Until the Customs and Border Protection agency rectify these border security issues, 
trade and travel will continue to be slowed at the shared border costing the region untold 
sums every day. 
B. REGIONAL STRATEGIES 
The Great Lakes regional strategies are not as straight forward as the national 
strategies. Each state has its own priorities, so there is not a single coherent regional 
homeland security strategy. In some cases, transportation strategies were also addressed 
too. On the other hand, there is a specific and cohesive maritime strategy for the Great 
Lakes region. Additionally, the Council of Great Lakes Governors, which includes six 
state governors from the region and two provinces in Canada, formed an alliance to 
further the region’s economic and trade objectives. While these strategies are somewhat 
loose as a whole, they do reveal a regional unity for security and trade. 
1. Great Lakes Regional Homeland Security Strategies 
The states of the Great Lakes region have a variety of priorities when it comes to 
their homeland security strategies. At present, only four of these six regional states that 
are on the northern border have produced a homeland security strategy. For example: 
Michigan’s 2009−2013 Homeland Security Strategy is short and vague. It takes an all-
hazards approach toward the diverse geography, resources, and industry that Michigan 
encompasses while using risk mitigation to achieve its strategy, but it does not offer any 
specifics. According to the strategy, “By founding its strategy on the capabilities and 
needs of our regional partners, Michigan can ensure that its state strategy accurately 
reflects both the current level of preparedness and the specific areas in which the state 
must support local governments to pursue a more secure Michigan.”226 To make this 
strategy work, people from the state and local agencies cooperate to safeguard its 
citizens. New York’s strategy is a similar all-hazards approach, but it requires its private 
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sector and the public to contribute its security, Michigan’s does not. New York strategy 
states, “New York State remains a major target of terrorist organizations and a State with 
an extensive history of natural disasters. The threat of catastrophic events, both natural 
and man-made, requires continuous attention and commitment from all levels of 
government, the private sector and the general public.”227 Ohio and Wisconsin also have 
similar strategies to Michigan and New York. However, Minnesota and Pennsylvania 
have not produced current homeland security strategies. Obviously, homeland security, 
and by extension, border security, are prioritized differently depending on the state. 
2. Great Lakes Maritime Strategy (2011) 
The 2011 Great Lakes Maritime Strategy: A Strategic Framework for the Coast 
Guard on the Great Lakes focuses on physical security of the Great Lakes maritime 
domain. It repeatedly mentions cooperation, partnerships, and collaboration, but it lacks a 
conviction for trade. Although the economic criticality of the Great Lakes is mentioned, 
the strategy simply fails to emphasize the significance of efficient trade along the 
northern border. The strategy does state, “[T]he entirety of our effort must be 
‘watermarked’ with Canada,” but it is referring to physical security, not trade.228 Maybe 
this is a step back from the importance of trade over security, but it is likely only an 
oversight―especially since the U.S. Coast Guard falls squarely under the purview of the 
Department of Homeland Security, which considers trade with Canada a priority. 
3. Regional Transportation Strategies 
All the states in the Great Lakes region consider transportation important. For 
example, Michigan decided to conduct the Michigan Department of Transportation 
(MDOT) State Long-Range Transportation Plan: Corridors and International Borders 
Report in 2007. Because Canada is the United States’ leading trading partner and 
Michigan is one of the main hubs for those border transactions, it makes sense for 
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Michigan to ease border restrictions in order to minimize barriers to trade. The report 
pointed out that “Michigan’s International Border Crossings and trade corridors are 
critical to the well-being of the local, state, and national economies and therefore critical 
to state and national security.”229 Therefore, “MDOT has actively worked with the US 
Department of Homeland Security to minimize the impacts of delays.”230 Clearly, 
Michigan, among other regional partners, recognizes the vital role that transportation 
plays in the U.S.-Canadian trading partnership. 
4. Trade 
Economic stability brings regional stability. This stability hinges on the region’s 
ability to ensure trade efficiently crosses the U.S.-Canadian border while acknowledging 
the necessity for some border restrictions to help guarantee their security. Therefore, the 
Great Lakes region formed the Council of Great Lakes Governors. 
The council has one simple mission: To encourage and facilitate 
environmentally responsible economic growth through a cooperative 
effort between the public and private sectors among the eight Great Lakes 
States and with Ontario and Québec. Through the Council, Governors 
work collectively to ensure that the entire Great Lakes region is both 
economically sound and environmentally conscious in addressing today’s 
problems and tomorrow’s challenges.231 
The Council of Great Lakes Governors works of projects with Canada from oil pipelines 
to video game manufacturing. Each project creates stronger ties between the United 
States and Canada that strengthens the region’s interconnectedness. As this happens, the 
region’s economy and security is reinforced. 
C. GREAT LAKES SECURITY AND TRADE INSTITUTIONS 
A variety of organizations provide border security and trade oversight in the Great 
Lakes region. Nearly all of these organizations fall under the purview of the Department 
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of Homeland Security. The U.S. Coast Guard monitors the waterways in conjunction 
with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agency; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF). The Operational Integration Center at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in 
Michigan and numerous fusion centers interspersed throughout the region also contribute 
to the security of the region. The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the 
Great Lakes Metro Chambers Coalition, and multiple other state and local agencies help 
facilitate trade with Canada. All of these institutions cooperate with their Canadian 
counterparts, which reinforces their abilities to ensure border security and trade oversight 
for the region. 
Over the past decade, funding for these organizations has continued to rise, but in 
today’s fiscal environment some of these organizations have begun to see reductions. 
Fortunately, during the last several years, some of these organizations began to foster 
partnerships among themselves, which has enabled them to use their finite resources 
more effectively. Regardless, federal budget reductions are the red flag that the northern 
states should be watching for, because as the federal funding dries up it will be incumbent 
on those states to provide their own security once again. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Great Lakes region’s states are dependent on both the U.S. federal security 
funding and the trade with Canada. Each state understands the precarious tightrope they 
walk. They must ensure the federal security funding keeps flowing from Washington 
while not permitting their security institutions from placing excessive restrictions at the 
border that would overtly interfere with their Canadian trading partners. Ultimately, this 
means that they must play both sides of the field without being overly supportive of 
either one. If they do not, some of the money stops flowing. It is quite possible that some 
of the money may start slowing from the U.S. security infrastructure anyway, particularly 
if Americans lose interest in the Homeland Security enterprise. If interest wanes, these 
states will be more responsible for their own security, which will inevitably impact the 
region’s economics, because these states will have to pick up the tab for some of it 
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themselves. On the other hand, if U.S. security concerns increase, then border security 
policies could create more border restrictions, which will negatively impact trade with 
Canada. Either way, border security is a critical issue that must be in proper balance for 


























VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The U.S.-Canada border relationship must be cultivated to prevent excessive 
border security measures resulting in detrimental trade restrictions and economic disaster, 
particularly if the worst case scenario were to happen: another terrorist attack, this one 
launched from the Canadian side. Aside from the expected post-attack pandemonium, 
there would be a great deal of finger-pointing and recriminations between two long-
standing NATO allies. Americans would blame the U.S. federal government for not 
protecting them at the border, and Washington would lambast Ottawa for failing to 
foresee or interrupt an impending attack. American unilateralism will force the border to 
be locked down again, and Canadians and the Great Lakes regional states will suffer 
economic ruin as border security morphs into something similar to the U.S.-Mexico 
frontier. It could even threaten the very existence of institutions like NATO, because the 
United States could become unwilling to trust institutions that rely on joint security 
efforts. 
Of course, homeland security and national security policy, on the best days, 
entails much hoping for the best and planning for the worst. To be effective on either 
front, however, the United States and Canada must take decisive steps. First, both 
countries need to buy into one bilateral agreement between them and stay committed to 
it. Second, both countries need to listen to each other and speak the same language about 
border security. Third, Canada needs to maintain a transparent border security effort. 
Fourth, the United States needs to consider the economic ramifications of overly 
restrictive border security measures that severely impact the Canadians and the Great 
Lakes regional states. Fifth, the Great Lakes regional states need to consider the 
economic risk of overreliance on U.S. federal funding as interests wane once again at the 
shared border. 
A. MAKE A PLAN AND STICK WITH IT 
Strengthening existing bilateral agreements could help prevent an attack 
originating from Canada―as well as mitigate the worst effects if such a disaster came to 
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pass. Unfortunately, all too often, the United States and Canada make new security and 
trade agreements rendering previous ones moot before the earlier ones have a chance to 
make any substantial difference. 
The last 20 years have been full of examples. The Beyond the Border action plan 
is the latest bilateral agreement. It calls for greater security cooperation and trade 
facilitation, and it addresses how to better integrate and manage the U.S.-Canada long-
term partnership. This plan could work if both countries actually give it sufficient 
attention and do not throw it away like so many others. Just because a new administration 
comes into office or some political elite draws up a new plan should not be a catalyst for 
exchanging one border security plan for another. It does not give the bilateral agreement 
time to really work. 
Changing for the sake of changing is not in the best interest of either government, 
the people of the Great Lakes region, or anyone else that cross-border flows effect. 
Instead, all parties involved must commit to updating existing plans so they are relevant 
with the times―much the way NATO has evolved since the Cold War ended―not 
haphazardly as the last couple of decades have revealed about U.S.-Canada border 
policies. 
B. LISTEN AND SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE 
Maybe the single most important recommendation that would help strengthen the 
U.S.-Canada relationship and allay fears about regarding this worst case is that both 
federal governments need to listen to each other and speak the same policy language. It 
really is no secret that the U.S. government thinks in terms of security, especially since 
the 9/11 terror attacks, and that Canada is determined to enhance trade efficiencies at the 
border. 
However, both governments only acknowledge the other countries concerns while 
still trying to impose their policy on their ally. In the case of the United States, it tries to 
steamroll its security policies into Canadian politics through unilateralism. On the other 
hand, Canada tries to be more covert by burden-shifting its trade concerns into American 
politics by creating institutions, but they really are looking for ways to placate American 
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policymakers that will bolster trade relations. When Washington and Ottawa policy elites 
sit down together, they should attempt to actually listen to the concerns of the other 
country. 
Trade and security are both important issues for the U.S.-Canada border. Find a 
balance that both governments are truly willing to accept and see it done. 
C. MAINTAIN TRANSPARENCY 
Canadian transparency would soften the blow of excessive border security 
policies if an attack originated in Canada. When Canada keeps its border security efforts 
veiled in secrecy it makes American policymakers question Canadian convictions for 
effective border security efforts. Lift the veil and let Americans see what efforts the 
Canadians are taking to enhance security for people on both sides of the shared border. 
Sure there are nice government websites that depict a robust Canadian national security 
establishment, but that takes the average consumer of information time and energy to 
peruse.  
Canadians must put more of their effective border security efforts in the media 
through sound bites and headlines. Americans will periodically see and hear that Canada 
is making an effort. It could ultimately help secure the border by making it appear less 
appealing for criminals and terrorists, which could quell U.S. concerns for additional 
security and increase efficient trade. Essentially, transparency will change the way people 
in both countries view the border for the better. 
D. DO NOT OVERREACT 
If a terrorist attack does originate from Canada, Americans must not overreact at 
the border. The repercussions would be numerous and severe. Understanding these 
repercussions will help avoid that overreaction. Most Canadians live along the shared 
border, but most Americans do not. This situation creates a huge perception divide. When 
Canadians think about increased border restrictions they know that it will have a 
detrimental effect on their daily lives. The Great Lakes regional states recognize, for the 
most part, that increased border security can destroy local economies. They would 
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typically prefer to have efficient trade to excessive border security, but of course they 
receive a hefty sum from the U.S. federal government to implement often overly 
restrictive security policies. 
The same is just not true for the vast majority of Americans who only perceive 
that tighter border restrictions could in theory protect them from harm. This perceptional 
gap is what the U.S. federal government must remember when creating policies that 
affects the millions of people who depend on the U.S.-Canada border for their livelihood. 
It is irresponsible to all of them for Washington elites to overreact to negligible security 
threats from Canada that meanwhile cripple local communities with unwarranted border 
security measures. Certainly security for American citizens is important, but U.S.-Canada 
border security must be done in a balanced and measured approach, not in a rash and 
excessive manner. 
Obviously, the United States must avoid the “Mexicanization of the U.S.-Canada 
border.”232 Taking a hard right in security policies does not necessarily make one less 
vulnerable to attack, but it can have disastrous effects on an important security ally and 
all the American states along the shared border. It could also have a crippling effect on 
the NATO alliance, because Americans could rip the security partnership apart trying to 
secure its own borders. Not only would the old alliance between the United States and 
Canada be tested, but it throws into question the relevance and viability of multilateral 
security institutions like NATO around the world. Therefore, a future research question 
that should be considered is the possible repercussions of another terrorist attack on the 
United States that originates in Canada and its impact and implications on institutions 
such as NATO. 
E. BE WARY OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE 
The Great Lakes regional states need to be wary of economic dependence on the 
Homeland Security enterprise. At present, Americans are enamored with their wallet, and 
they are losing interest in security initiatives that were so important to them in the recent 
past. In addition, the U.S. federal government is struggling to compromise on anything, 
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particularly the federal budget. Severe economic cuts could impact any number of U.S. 
federal programs, which will likely include institutions and agencies that consider border 
security one of their primary missions. 
The Great Lakes region may be called upon to fill a security gap left when federal 
institutions pull back from their security mission on the U.S. northern border. The region 
must prepare itself for this contingency by weaning itself off the significant federal 
dollars that flow their way from these institutions. Lobbying for these institutions to 
remain as they are is likely a fruitless effort, especially if the historical evidence of the 
northern border is any indication for future northern border policy. In other words, it is 
only a matter of time before the northern border is left to its own devices once again. The 
Great Lakes regional states must not sit idle and let this happen to themselves. Take 
action and prepare for federal border security funding reductions to take place because 
they very likely will. 
F. FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis has revealed that there is an ongoing tug-of-war between the United 
States Canada regarding security versus trade. Historically, the United States has 
routinely and abruptly flip-flopped between security and trade, leaving Canada 
scrambling to interpret these confounding border policy shifts. The most recent shift was 
due to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Since then, the U.S. federal 
government has maintained a security-first mentality, affected for the most part 
unilaterally. Quite the opposite is Canada’s insistence on efficient trade and shrewd 
burden-shifting tactics. Admittedly, Canada did initially jump on the American security-
first bandwagon, as benefits a solid ally, but shortly thereafter it jumped off again in an 
effort to bolster the trade relationship. 
Meanwhile, the American states in the Great Lakes region are caught in the 
middle between these two giants and their national border security policies. On the one 
hand, the region’s states must support the American security-first mentality due to their 
vested interest in the U.S. Homeland Security enterprise and their desire to receive 
further federal funding. On the other hand, these states depend heavily on trade with 
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Canada. Their precarious situation makes them particularly susceptible to policy shifts 
within either country. 
Obviously, policy positions are never static. World events and popular 
demand―the key motivator in democracies―see to that. As Canada continues to push 
for a more open border and American policymakers continue to dig in their heels with 
trade-inhibitive security measures―even in the face of constricting federal 
budgets―these Great Lakes regional states may eventually find themselves bearing the 
brunt of this policy imbalance. In essence, the onus for security may fall squarely on their 
shoulders. In some ways this could be considered a benefit to the U.S.-Canada trade 
relationship, because it could ease border restrictions. In other ways it would crush local 
economies in the Great Lakes region that have become dependent on the federal funding 
that may slowly disappear with time. Without question, the Great Lakes regional states 
are in a tough spot, because they are caught in the middle at the U.S.-Canada border. 
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